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I. Introduction
About fifty years have gone by since international humanitarian
law was applied to the prosecution and punishment of war criminals.1
Just a few years ago, the international humanitarian law most law
students learned about was couched within public international law,
often studied without any serious intention of ever applying it. In
more recent years, however, human rights courses have become
ubiquitous in law schools, and journals dedicated to the publication of
human rights articles have become abundant.
Generally speaking, international humanitarian law applies to
cases of internal and external armed conflicts. It applies when war
prevents people from exercising their rights. The genocide in
Rwanda and the massacres in Ethiopia primarily present human
rights law violations of a more general nature and application than
international humanitarian law. However, international
humanitarian law and human rights law are interrelated and
1. The most important trials were those conducted in Nuremberg and Tokyo in
1945 and the subsequent years by the victorious Allies. These resulted in the
conviction and punishment of several German Nazi and Japanese Officials. In
Nuremberg twenty-two defendants were indicted on seventy-four counts. Three of
the defendants were acquitted. "Seven were sentenced to prison terms ranging from
10 years to life, and twelve were sentenced to death by hanging." Mathew Lippman,
Nuremburg: Forty-Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 27 (1991). Later, other
Nazi officials were tried by courts of several nations. See Case No. 74, in XII LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 112-14 (1948) For a non-legal analysis of the
Nuremberg trials and the circumstances surrounding them, see JOSEPH PERISCO,
NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL (1994) and ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT
NUREMBERG (1989).
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complementary. If the two were compressed into one category, they
could be referred to as "humane law," which would mean law that
ensures respect for the protection and development of human beings.
In any case, gross violations of human rights law rarely occur without
armed conflict, though the nexus between the violations and the
conflict may not be obvious.2
Recent prosecutions of war criminals in former Yugoslavia, the
presence of genocide' suspects in Rwanda and the impending
2. See generally HENRY DUNANT INST. El" AL., INTERNATIONAL DIENSIONS OF
HUS.LANrrARAN LAW (1988). The genocide in Rwanda and the massacres in
Ethiopia were committed in an environment of internal armed conflict. In R%%anda,
the killing of the Tutsis intensified whenever the Hutu extremists and the R%%andan
Army suffered defeat at the hand of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, an opposition
armed group. The killings were carried out away from the battle fields and largely by
the civilian Hutu population assisted by the Rwandan Armed forces and the militia of
the different political parties. The fact that the armed struggle in Rwanda was first
launched from Uganda by Rwandan exiles organized around Rwandese Patriotic
Front does not make the conflict external. Once the struggle was launched, the
conflict remained within the confines of Rwandan territory involving R%%andan
combatants only, on both sides. It would not make much difference from the
perspective of prosecution of suspects for crimes against humanity whether the
armed conflict was internal or external. The purpose of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rvanda seems not only to prosecute serious violations of international
humanitarian law, but also serious violations of human rights law referred to in the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal as genocide and crimes against
humanity in addition to violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols. See, Annex, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
infra note 4.
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICTR) for Rwanda
seems to classify genocide as being a part of international humanitarian law, though it
may be committed in an environment where it may not be related to armed conflict if
there is one. The Security Council Resolution, which created the Tribunal, (see infra
note 5), refers to those targeted for indictment and prosecution as "Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law...", while Article 1 of the same Statute characterizes them as
"persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law"
without including the word "genocide" in the sentence. See, Annex, Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, infra note 4.
3. The meaning of "genocide" has been the subject of much controversy as
noted below. We will therefore operate with the definition given belom :
Article II
[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
establishment of the Permanent International Criminal Tribunal by
the United Nations have revived interest in international
humanitarian law. There is particular interest in genocide, crimes
against humanity' and violations of article 3 common tc, the Geneva
Convention and Additional Protocol II, which are all recent
additions to international humanitarian law. Only a few years ago,
international humanitarian law covered prohibitions of slavery, piracy
and certain violations of international regulations governing armed
conflict;6 these are all now principles of customary international law.'
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcible transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable;
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide.
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, (entered into force Jan. 12 1951) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
4. Article 3 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda defines crimes
against humanity as follows:
[T]he following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,








(h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) Other inhumane acts.
See Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR annexed 955, U.N.SCOR, 3453"4 meeting, 8
November 1994, U.N. Doc. 97 (1994). The Genocide Convention is the first
international human rights instrument to set standards on human rights for states to
observe and punish when its provisions are violated. See Antonio Cassesse, A New
Approach to Human Rights: The European Convention for the Prevendon of Torture,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1989).
5. See Article 4 of the ICTR Statute supra note 4 for acts which constitute
violations of Article 3, common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
II.
6. Besides international customary laws, there has been in recent years an
upsurge of international conventional laws governing individual criminal
responsibilities. See M. CHERiF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 192-93 (1992).
[Vol. 22:667
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After the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, international
humanitarian law was rarely enforced. Pleas for investigation and
prosecution of various inhumane acts perpetrated on ethnic
minorities, political, national and religious groups and others fell on
deaf international ears, perpetuating a culture of impunity. ' The main
reason for the failure to prosecute these widespread violations may be
the lack of political will on the part of the international community."
In addition, the parameters of these inchoate crimes were in doubt,
and only a few countries provided laws for their punishment."
Furthermore, many States were leery of pressing human rights issues
with other governments because they feared that such intervention
would be considered undue interference in the internal affairs of
those countries and would exacerbate international tension." All of
these factors hampered the application of the well-accepted principle
7. Customary international law is a "general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (,1987).
S. Many mass killings which may or may not have had the requisite
characteristics of genocide and crimes against humanity have taken place in many
parts of the world since the Genocide Convention has been adopted. The attempt by
the People's Republic of China to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group from 1950
to 1960, the eight large-scale massacres of Tutsis by extremist Hutus since 1959, the
thousands of the Ibos killed by the Nigerian Army in the 1960s, the estimated 1.3
million Bengalis killed by East Pakistanis in 1971, the killing of the Hmong people by
the Government of Laos in 1981, the estimated three million killed by Pol Pots
regime in Kampuchea from 1975 to 1978, the massacre of hundreds of thousand
Ugandans by Idi Amin Dada from 1971 to 1978, the killing and disappearance of
hundreds of thousands of young Ethiopians during Mengistu's regime, the list goes
on. These may all have some elements of either genocide or crimes against
humanity, or both. However, no investigation was undertaken by the United Nations
to establish whether these killings and persecutions constituted genocide and crimes
against humanity for the purpose of prosecuting the leaders of these horrendous acts.
See Jean E. Zeiler, Genocide Convention-International Starration-Ethiopian
Famine in the Eritrean War for hzdependence: The Applicability of the Genocide
Convention to Government Imposed Famine in Eritrca, 19 GA. J. INT'L & CiMP. L.
589, 601 (1989); see also U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities; Revised and Updated Report on the Question of tie
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, at 9-10, U.N. Doc.E ICN.4 /Sub
2/ 198516 (1985).
9. See Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge
to Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229 (1995).
10. Although the Genocide Convention was promulgated in 194S, few countries
ratified it until 1993.
1L See Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, 100 YALE Li. 2537, 2258 (1991).
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of criminal law, nullum crimen sine lege and nulla pena sina lege."2
(No crime without law and no punishment without law). Today,
however, "genocide" is a violation of customary international law and
enjoys universal acceptance.13
The resurgence14 of international humanitarian law is a result of
the recent atrocities committed in many parts of the world.
International recognition of these atrocities resulted in the
prosecution of mass murderers in Equatorial Guinea,1' the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Ethiopia. 6 The demise of Cold War
competition, democratization of former autocratic States, the
increasing notion of acceptance of human rights all contributed to
bring the question of justice and human rights to the forefront. 7 In
12. This major challenge to the Nuremberg prosecutions, relevant to the ICTR
process, raised by the defense was answered with the argument tht the acts with
which the defendants were charged were in fact already recognized as prohibited acts
by customary international law, from which derogation was not permissible, though
penalties may not have been set. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal
(1945) defined the parameter of crimes that already existed as international
customary law and provide for punishment. Professor Hans Kelsen opposed this
view, arguing that the notion that the Charter reflected the existing international
customary law was a mere "fiction." See Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the
Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
153,162 (1947).
13. By December 31, 1993, 112 countries had ratified the Genocide Convention.
See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, STATUS
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1993 at 91-92, U.N. Doc. ST/Leg/Ser. E. 712, J.N. Sales No.
E.94.V.II (1994). The International Court of Justice has now affirmed genocide as a
part of customary international law from which no derogation is allowed.
14. At the present time, few nations are against extending the principles of
international humanitarian laws to foreign countries as can be corfirmed by the
signatures of and accession to Conventions on Genocide, Torture, Air Hijacking and
almost unanimous support for the establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunals both in the Hague for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in
Arusha, Tanzania for crimes committed in Rwanda. See Staff Reporter, After U.S.
Poll, Time to Deal With War Criminals, DAILY NATION, Nov. 8, 1996, at 2.
15. In a little known trial, the tyrant Macias, President of Equatorial Guinea was
tried in his own country, found guilty of a variety of crimes including genocide and
executed. See LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 16 (1985).
16. In the case of Rwanda, see Letter from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council "transmitting the interim report of the commission
of Experts on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law in
Rwanda, including possible acts of genocide", S/1994/1125, 4 October 1994,
Document 92.
17. See generally ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR
AND STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1998). See also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFER GENOCIDE AND MASS
[Vol. 22:667
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addition, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions established in
South Africa, Argentina and other countries that determined
accountability, if not punishment of human rights violators, are also a
recognition of the need to deal with gross violations of international
humanitarian law.'
International humanitarian law violations since the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials are generally prosecuted in either national courts or
ad hoc international tribunals. National courts prosecute violations of
international humanitarian law incorporated into domestic laws.
Rwanda and Ethiopia ratified the Genocide Convention and
incorporated the genocide provision of the Convention into their
domestic law.19 Prosecutions in the national courts of these two
countries, therefore, proceed on violations of these international
humanitarian agreements. Other countries have prosecuted persons
suspected of serious violations of international humanitarian laws in
national courts. " Ad hoc international tribunals are established by
the U.N. Security Council and have the power to prosecute persons
specified in the statutes establishing the tribunals.21
This article compares the prosecutorial process of national courts
and ad hoc international tribunals and attempts to reach tentative
conclusions as to which is better positioned to render fair and
VIOLENCE (1998).
18. Since 1974 truth and reconciliation commissions have proliferated in many
parts of the world. For an overview of their activities, see Priscilla B. Hav nvr, Fifteen
Truth Commissions 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 Hu%, . RTS. Q. 597 (1994).
19. In 1993 Ethiopia ratified several international human rights instruments
including the Genocide Convention. Rwanda acceded to the Genocide Convention
on 16 April 1975 with the reservation that "The Rwandese Republic does not
consider itself bound by Article LX of the Convention." Article X states:
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation,
application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating
to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.
Such reservations may have no value. Since the law against genocide has
become part of customary international law, against which no derogation is
permitted, both Ethiopia and Rwanda would be bound by it even if they had not
ratified the Convention. Any evidence of a violation against international
humanitarian law obligates Ethiopia and Rwanda to prosecute the transgressors. See
Genocide Convention, supra note 3, arts. 4,5.
20. The Adolf Eichmann case in Israel, the Imre Pinta case in Canada and Klaus
Barbie case in France are few of the examples of war crime suspects being prosecuted
for violations of international humanitarian law in national courts.
21. See ICTR Statute, supra note 4.
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impartial justice to the accused and the victims.' The fairness of the
systems will be gauged by juxtaposing the processes against the
standards set by customary international law and the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).'
The focus of this article is on the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR or Tribunal) and the Ethiopian Office of the
Special Prosecutor (SPO). It compares the establishment,
jurisdiction, adequacy of infrastructure, available resources, and the
appointment and independence of judges and prosecutors. Also, an
evaluation is made of the possible benefits that may accrue to the
countries concerned as the result of these trials.
Though the ICTR has two functioning Chambers and another
approved by the U.N. Security Council,24 analysis of the ICTR is
limited to the First Chamber, which is currently trying Jean Paul
Akayesu and George A.N. Rutaganda.' The Ethiopian analysis is
limited to the First Criminal Division of the Ethiopian Central High
Court where Derg-WPE26 officials are currently being tried. Since the
22. While the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
mandates fair trial and respect of the rights of the accused in the proceedings, it
requires that due regard be given to the protection of victims and witnesses. See
ICIR Statute, supra note 4, at arts. 19, 21. The Statute says nothing about the rights
of the victims and their loved ones.
23. These rights are stated in various human rights instruments including
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Optional Protocols.
24. See S.C. Res 1165, U.N. SCOR, 3877th Sess., U.N. DOC. S/RES/1165 (1998).
25. Prosecutor versus Jean Paul Akayesu Case No. ICTR -96-4-T (unpublished),
1996 and Prosecutor versus George A.N. Rutaganda Case No. ICTR-963-T, 1996,
(unpublished).
26. "Derg" in Amharic, the national language of Ethiopia, is an archaic word
literally meaning "committee." This committee constituted cormnissioned and
noncommissioned officers of the army, air force, police force and a sort of militia
known as the territorial army, initially numbered 120. By the time the Derg members
were brought to trial, their numbers were reduced to about 45 by earlier
assassinations and dismissals. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who originally was
vice Chairman of the Derg, emerged as the absolute dictator by executing two
chairmen of the Derg who were his superiors. A report by Amnesty International
gives a brief history of the Derg-WPE and describes human rights violations from
1974 to 1991. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ETHIOPIA -END OF AN ERA OF BRUTAL
REPRESSION: A NEW CHANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, (A 1l) (June 1991).
The Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), which professed communist ideology, was the
sole authorized political party in the country at the time. See Recognition of the
Leading Role of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, Proclamation No 267 of 1984,
Negarit Gazette, No. 17, 1984. The accused were either leaders, members or
[Vol. 22:667
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national prosecutions in Ethiopia and Rwanda are similar, this article
limits its comparison to the domestic Ethiopian trial processes and the
trials before the internationally established ICTR, with only
occasional cursory references to the trials underway in the national
courts of Rwanda.27
Because the atrocities in both countries were committed within a
specific historical context, it is necessary to examine the facts that led
to the establishment of the ICTR and prosecutions in the Ethiopian
Court.
II. Background to Violations of International Humanitarian
and Human Rights Laws
A. Ethiopia
The atrocities perpetrated by the Derg-WPE on the Ethiopian
people are intimately intertwined with the 1974 Revolution. The
1974 Ethiopian Revolution broke the age-old shackles of feudal order
and absolute monarchy and established the most radical re-alignment
of social and property classes ever witnessed in Africa.: The
Revolution was, without doubt, a major watershed in the long history
of Ethiopia. Riding on the tails of the popular uprising, the Derg
seized power, overthrew and jailed the long reigning Emperor Haile
Sellassie, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Parliament and
established a provisional military government-the precursor of the
sympathizers of this Party and they committed the atrocities allegedly at the behest
of the Party leaders and the Derg officials.
27. The present Rwandan Government has arrested about 130,M4-) persons
suspected of committing genocide. The are being held in jail wvaiting trial. Out of
these detainees, by July 14, 1998 about 400 suspects had been tried and 22 w ere
publicly executed. Several have been convicted and sentenced to death and various
length of prison terms. See Remy Ourdan, La Reconciliation Impossible
(Reconciliation Impossible), LE MONDE, Apr. 3, 1998, at 1-3 (translation by author).
28. See generally FRED HALLIDAY & MAXINE MOLYINEUx, THE ETHIOPIAN
REVOLUTION (1981). While Halliday and Molyneux formed their impression at the
early stage of the Revolution, which was indeed very radical, the characterization of
the Ethiopian Revolution as being the most radical departure from the old order in
Africa, is increasingly being challenged. Many now argue that the Derg, %%hile
outwardly maintaining the veneer of communism, actually wvas as Byzantine as its
predecessors. For the most thorough and detailed factual accounts to date, of the
Revolution, see ANDARGACHEW TIRUNEH, THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION: FROM A'N
ARISTOCRATIC TO A TOTALITARIAN AurrocRAcY (1993); see also RE a LEFORT,
ETHOPIA: AN HERETCAL REVOLUTION (1981).
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Derg-WPE.2 ' The Derg movement ushered in seventeen years of
violence and terror characterized by systematic executions, tortures,
disappearances, imprisonments and other widespread violations of
human rights." The atrocities perpetrated by the Derg, especially
against youth, drenched the country in a blood bath to an extent
heretofore unknown in Ethiopian history."
As the left wing of the Derg headed by then first Vice Chairman
Mengistu Hailemariam became stronger following the execution of its
Chairman and the top six leaders, the race towards Marxist-Leninist
ideology accelerated.32 In 1980, Ethiopia was officially declared a
Marxist-Leninist society with the ultimate objective of building a
communist society.3 From that point forward, Marxist interpretation
of the law was the only acceptable way to apply, or more correctly
" not apply," the law. The law then became, as per Lenin's dictum, "a
political instrument" or politics itself,34 regarded as an organ for the
oppression of one class by another. Legality was disregarded if it
contradicted the interest of what Vishinisky-Stalin's notorious
prosecutor-called "the highest law," the proletarian revolution."
The purpose of law, therefore, was to suppress class elements hostile
to the dictatorship of the proletariat."
Consistent with this Marxist view of the law and legal process,
the Derg began circumventing the legal process in favor of political
dispositions of outstanding problems, including criminal matters."
For example, on November 23, 1975, the Derg without any semblance
of trial executed sixty former government officials, including two
29. Id. at 52-96.
30. For a detailed account of serious violations of human rights, see ALEX DE
WAAL, EVIL DAYs-30 YEARS OF WAR AND FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA (1991).
31. See generally BABILE TOLA, To KILL A GENERATION (1989).
32. See Yacob Haile-Mariam, "The Destruction of Rule of Law Under Military
Dictatorship in Ethiopia", Proceedings, 5'h International Conference on the Horn of
Africa, (May 26-28,1991).
33. See Proclamation No. 174 / 1980, Negarit Gazetta, 3V, Year, No. 5, 1980.
34. See V.I. Lenin, Concerning a Caricature of Marxism and Concerning
Imperialist Economism, in COLLECrED WORKS 79 (4th ed. 1949).
35. A.Y. Vishinisky, The Fundamental Task of the Soviet Law, in SOVIET LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY (Hugh W. Babb trans., 1951).
36. The term "dictatorship" in this context meant "nothing less than power
unlimited by absolute rules and depending upon force." See PASHUKANIS EVGENII,
SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND THE LAW 3 (Piers Berne & Robert Sharlet
eds.; Peter Magg trans., 1951).
37. See Yacob Haile-Mariam, supra note 32.
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prime ministers, high level army, air force, navy and police officers
and high ranking civilians and soldiers. These summary executions
dispensed with the most elementary procedural guarantees of due
process. The next day the Derg justified the executions as a
"political measure" taken against an enemy of the Revolution.'
After that, "[t]he Derg organized throughout much of the country a
deliberate use of terror to sustain its rule, a large-scale system of
summary executions, torture, and disappearances. Thousands
perished, and many thousands more suffered physical abuse from this
State-sponsored violence."
These executions, however, were a mere dress rehearsal for the
forthcoming "Red Terror," a term from the Russian Revolutionary
lexicon meaning the liquidation of counter-revolutionaries." The
Red Terror in Ethiopia-a well-coordinated massacre-was directed
against those opposed to military rule, most of whom were members
of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP). " At times
the EPRP, together with other parties such as the Ethiopian
Democratic Union (EDU), the Tigrean People's Liberation Front
(TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and other insurgent groups.
strongly and violently opposed military rule."'
From 1975 to 1988, the law of the jungle ruled. The Derg
strangled the eighty-three years old, sick and feeble Emperor Haile
Selassie while he slept in his bedchamber. The entire State system,
from soldiers to judges, intellectuals to peasants, was unleashed on
38. See generally HEINRICH SCHOLLER & PAUL BRIETZKE. ETHIuJmi.,:
REVOLUTION, LAW AND POLICS (1976).
39. Radio Addis Ababa, (Voice of Ethiopia broadcast, Nov. 24, 1975).
40. James C.N. Paul, Human Rights and the Structure of Security Forces in
Constitutional Orders: The Case of Ethiopia, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RiS. J. 1. 244
(1994).
41. See Yacob Haile-Mariam, supra note 32 at 50.
42. The indictments of the Ethiopian officials who are currently being tried .tates
that the victims were members of political groups. It is important to note that the
victims of the Red Terror were invariably targeted as members of political group,.
and not as members of any ethnic, national, religious or racial group'. See
Indictment, Special Prosecutor for the Transitional Government of Ethiopia v.
Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam, et. al. (Criminal Case No. 1787.) [hereinafter
Indictment].
43. For a detailed account of these groups and their respective objcetives, see
generally TIRUNEH, supra note 28.
44. This fact was stated by the personal butler of Emperor Haile Selassie in an
interview in Radio Addis Ababa, (Voice of Ethiopia broadcast, September 23. 1 1.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L Rev.
the so-called counter-revolutionaries. Thousands of young people
were gunned down on sight and in peaceful, public demonstrations in
Addis Ababa and other towns.45 Bodies littered the streets of Addis
Ababa with Marxist slogans pinned to them.46 Rural lowns did not
fare any better. Some who escaped the cities and took refuge in their
hometowns were caught and executed by peasant and urban dwellers
associations' militia.47  Thousands more disappeared and are still
missing.48 In 1977, it was estimated that thirty to fifty thousand people
were executed without ever having charges brought against them."'
Most of the victims were young between the ages of fourteen and
thirty."
On May 8, 1991, the Ethiopian Peoples' P evolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF)-a coalition of ethnic and political
groups dominated by the TPLF-captured Addis Ababa, ending
more than seventeen years of civil war." Following a peace
conference, the EPRDF established a transitional government
composed of representatives from several political parties and
political ethnic organizations. On July 22, 1991, the transitional
government created a transitional charter, which was finally replaced
by a permanent constitution in 1996.5
45. See HEINRICH SCHOLLER & PAUL RIETZKE, supra note 38.
46. Id.
47. The author's two cousins and several of his friends, all of them less than
twenty five years old, who had escaped the killers in Addis Ababa, sought refuge in
their hometown Imdibir. They were hunted down and killed by the peasant
association militia in April 1978.
48. See James C.N. Paul, supra note 40, at 244.
49. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ETHIOPIA (Dec.
1977). Killings continued well into 1980 and estimates of persons killed by the end of
the Red Terror ran as high as 150,000 to 200,000. Persons jailed without trial were
estimated to be well over 400,000, according to interviews given by officials of the
Red Terror Victims Coordinating Committee, on Radio Addis Ababa, (Voice of
Ethiopia broadcast, June 18, 1993).
50. Id.
51. See Paul H. Brietske, Ethiopia's Leap in the Dark: Fede,-alism and Self
Determination in the New Constitution, 39 J. AFR. L 1, 20 (1995).
52. The exclusion of some parties such as the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary
Party, All Ethiopian Socialist Movement and others from the Conference, in addition
to other policy matters, is still a point of contention between the EPRDF and these
opposition parties. The Ad Hoc Peace Committee, formed by a group of Ethiopians
in the US of which the author was eventually the Executive Directoi, unsuccessfully
tried to intercede with the EPRDF to allow the opposition parties to take part in the
Peace Conference.
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After capturing Addis Ababa, the EPRDF troops arrested and
detained approximately two thousand persons they believed
participated in various human rights violations, including summary
execution, illegal detention, torture and genocide' 3 By 1997, charges
against 5,198 individuals were filed; however, less than half of those
charged are presently detained.q Most of the defeated Derg-WPE
leaders were arrested following the capture of Addis Ababa by the
EPRDF. Other Derg members took refuge in the Italian embassy or
fled the country.5
Unlike the past when government officials were massacred the
moment they lost power, Derg leaders are being held accountable for
official misconduct in a court of law!' The prosecution is immense;
the SPO presented over five hundred witnesses and promised to
present another five hundred, in addition to physical evidence."' The
court denied a motion by the defense requesting the court to instruct
the prosecutor to rest his case and issue a directed verdict. By
August 1998, the trial of the first group, representing the top persons
in power, was nowhere near conclusion. This trial process is just the
beginning, and the Special Prosecutor announced that thousands w ill
be tried, including the leaders of peasant and urban-dweller
53. See TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA, REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR (Feb. 1994).
54. OYVIND AADLAND, REPORT OF AN ASSESSMENT STUDY OF THE STATUS AND
CONTEXT OF THE "DERG-TRIAL" IN ETHIOPIA (1997).
55. President Mengistu Hailemariam, however, escaped to Zimbabwe a few days
before the fall of his government. See Indictment, supra note 42.
56. Following an attempted coup d'etat by General Mengistu Neway and his
brother Ermame against Emperor Haile Selassie in 1960, government officials,
including well known patriots who for five years conducted relentless guerrilla
warfare against Italian Fascist occupation from 1935 to 1942, were massacred without
a trial. See RICHARD GREENFIELD, ETHIOPIA: A NEW POLITICAL HIsTORY 374-452
(1965).
57. Trial of Former Derg Officials Once Again Adjourned, ADDIS TRIBUNE, July
24,1998, at 1.
58. Article 141: Acquittal of accused when no case for prosecution.
When the case for prosecution is concluded, the court, if it finds that no case
against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his
conviction, shall record an order of acquittal. See ETHIOPIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE art. 141 (1961).
While the purpose of the Ethiopian trials was to record for posterity a
detailed and authentic record of what happened during the Red Terror, it should not
be done at the expense of the rights of the accused. The primary purpose of any trial
is to establish guilt or innocence of the accused. Other peripheral matters can only
be pursued if this central objective will not be compromised.
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associations. 9  He characterized his task as being the largest
investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses since
Nuremberg.'
B. Rwanda
A starting point for the germination of genocide in Rwandd '
(which actually began with the advent of colonialism2 ) might be the
1959 so-called "social revolution."63 At this time, Tutsis, favored by
the colonial powers through whom they administered the colony,
began agitating for independence.' The Belgians did not take kindly
to this, considering it betrayal and treachery:
The break between the Belgian authorities and their long-coddled
Tutsi elite had come about only because the colonial administrators
felt betrayed by their erstwhile prot6g6s. They now considered
them as a mixture of backward traditionalists and revolutionary
59. TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 53.
60. Press Release, Office of the Special Prosecutor (Nov. 23,1995).
61. "While there is general argument among Rwanda Specialists that the roots of
the conflict lie in the transformation of ethnic identities that has accompanied the
advent of colonial rule, the chain of events leading to the killings begins with the
Hutu revolution of 1959-62." See Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda: The Rationality of
Genocide, ISSUES: 23/2 JOURNAL OF OPINION 8 (1995). For a history of ethnic
relations in Rwanda, see J.P. Chr6tien, Hutu et Tutsi au Rwand, et Burundi, in
AUCOEUR DE LtTHNIE [ Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi in AT THE HEART OF
ETHINICITY], 129-66 (J.L. Amselle & E. M'Bokolo eds., 1985).
62. The Berlin Conference scramble for Africa in 1888, the ar-ival of the first
German colonialists in the 1880s and of the Belgians after the First World War
exacerbated the existing social division, which to a large extent allocated an
inequitable division of labor in favor of the Tutsis. The colonialisis redefined and
rigidified these social relations and division of labor, ruling their colonial domain
through their Tutsi surrogates. As the Vice President and Mini:ter of Defense
General Paul Kagame claimed, "The hatred that was created between ethnic groups
was mainly entrenched by the colonial masters, here the Belgians [this] has been very
clear in the history of Rwanda, how they played their interests from one ethnic group
to another and how they institutionalized division among the people of Rwanda on
ethnic lines." National Press Club, "Morning Newsmaker with Rwandan Vice
President and Defense Minster Major General Paul Kagame", Federal New Service,
Dec. 13, 1994, reprinted in M.M. Wang, The International Tribunal for Rwanda:
Opportunities for Clarification: Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUMi. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 177-226 (1995).
63. For exaggerated claims of the achievements of the so called Revolution, see
D. MURENGO, LA REVOLUTION RWANDAISE (1959-62) (TIlE RWANDESE
REVOLUTION) (1975).
64. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 23-32,
(1995).
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communists, an unlikely combination which was not dissimilar from
the way the British then regarded the Mau Mau movement in
neighboring Kenya.65
The much acclaimed and often repeated "realities" of the 1959
Revolution demonstrate that it was, in fact, neither social nor a
revolution. It was a mere transfer of power from one ethnic elite to
another without any fundamental change in class relations. It was
simply an atavistic slide towards emphasizing the inherent worth of
being a Hutu over all other values." After the Revolution, the
Belgian authorities, now sympathetic to the Hutu elite, organized
elections between June 26 and July 30 1960. The PARMEHUTU, a
party advocating the emancipation of the Hutus, swept the elections,
capturing 229 newly created comntunes administered by
boutgemestres (mayors) fashioned along Belgian model." On
September 25, 1961, legislative elections were held again and
PARI1EHUTU captured seventy-eight percent of the seats virtually
eliminating Tutsi representationY The leader of PARAMEHUTU.
Gregoire Kayibanda, became the first President of Rwanda.
With no representation in these elections, Tutsis were relegated
to second-class citizenship. Worse still, the exile and massacre of the
Tutsis began following these elections. A grimly accurate U.N. report
predicted that the "developments of these last eighteen months have
brought about racial dictatorship of one party.... An oppressive
system has been replaced by another one [only more virulent].... It
is quite possible that some day we will witness violent reactions on the
part of the Tutsi."' ' By 1990, six to seven hundred thousand Tutsis
were exiled in neighboring countries, namely Burundi, what was then
Zaire (now the Republic of Congo), Tanzania and Uganda. The
majority of emigrating Tutsis left in early 1960.7'
65. Id. at 50. In this author's opinion, Prunier's book is one of the best account of
the germination, planning and execution of the genocide, written with a deep sense of
sympathy to the genocide victims.
66. See Hassan Ngezie, Ten conunandments of the Hutus, KxNGvCtRA, Dec. 1991).
67. See Prunier, supra note 64, at 52.
68. Id
69. See U.N. Trustee Commission Report, (Mar. 1961), cited in Prunier, supra
note 64, at 53.
70. For a detailed analysis of the refugee status of the Tutsis in the African Great
Lakes Region, see A. GUICHAOUA, LE PROBtME DES REFUGIES RV.ADAIS DES
POPULATIONS BANYARWANDA DANS LA RtGION DES GRANDS L'cs AFRIL.%I.s (THE
PROBLEM OF RWANDAN REFUGEES OF THE BANYARWANDA IN THE AFRIlCA 1i1EXI
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
At the height of ethnic violence and disturbances, Major-General
Juvenal Habyarimana took power in a popular bloodless coup d'etat
on July 5, 1973, affording some relief to the Tutsis from their
perennial persecution.7' Nonetheless, the system that relegated the
Tutsis to second-class citizens continued unabated. It was enforced
through a quota system that limited Tutsis to nine percent of school
enrollment and civil service positions.' The quota system totally
excluded Tutsis from the military, even though Tutsis represented at
least fourteen percent of the Rwandan people." Throughout
Habyarimana's rule, there would be no Tutsi bourgemestre (mayor)
or prefet (Provinicial Governor), only one military officer in the
whole army and one cabinet minister.74
Having been persecuted in their country of refuge, young Tutsis
in Uganda joined the then rebel leader Yoweri Museveni's National
Resistance Army (NRA) when he broke with Obote, then President
of Uganda, and launched a guerrilla war against Obote's murderous
regime." After the NRA liberated Uganda from Obote's regime,
Tutsis rose to very high positions -within the NRA. These elevated
Tutsis formed the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which avowed to
return to Rwanda by force if necessary.7 6 To this end they made
several ill-fated military attacks, each of which resulted in the death
of a large number of Tutsis by government forces in Rwanda."
Then on October 1, 1990, the tightly organized, baltle-hardened,
former NRA officers, soldiers and others invaded Rwanda from
Uganda under the leadership of the charismatic and popular former
NRA Commander in Chief and Minister of Defense, Major-General
Fred Rwigema, strategist Major Paul Kagame and others. ' As a
LAKES REGION) (1992).
71. See Prunier, supra note 64, at 75.
72. Id.
73. There are three ethnic/national groups in Rwanda. Hutus comprise
approximately 85%, Tutsis 14% and the Twa 1%. After 1994, RPF victory Tutsis
who were in exile returned to their homeland Rwanda from around the world. Some
have estimated their number to still be 14% despite one million Tutsis killed.
74. See Prunier, supra note 64, at 94.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See generally S.J. BARAHINYURA, LE GiNtRAL-MAJOR HABYARIMANA
(1973-87): QUINZE ANS DE TYRANNIE ET TARTUFFERIE AU RWANDA (FIFTEEN YEARS
OF TYRANNY AND HYPOCRICY) (1996).
78. Major Paul Kagame, now a Major General and Vice President of Rwanda,
was undergoing military training in the United States when he was recalled to lead
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result, the invasion and steady advance of the RPF, the massive exile,
massacre and destruction of Tutsi homes and property in Rwanda
intensified, and those activities set the stage for the forthcoming
apocalypse-genocide.
Forced by outside pressure and the RPF for democratization,
Habyarimana at long last accepted multi-partism for Rwanda.2 As a
result, several political parties sprang up in addition to
Habyarimana's Movement Revolutionaire National pour le
Development et la Democratic (MRND(D)), into which every
Rwandan was born a member, including Coalition pour la Defense de
la Republic (CDR), composed of extremist Tutsi haters. The
MRND and the CDR formed militia that they largely recruited from
the lumpenproletariat elements-the most vicious being the
Interahamwe (those who work together) of the MRND and the militia
of the CDR, trained by the French-later killing machines of the
genocide."
In the meantime, the war continued, and the RPF made steady
gains over government forces.' Government forces took out their
frustrations for their defeat on rural Tutsi peasants by calling those
who deserved to be crushed invenzi (cockroaches) and branding them
ibyitso' (accomplice). The Tutsi peasants became legitimate targets
for attack.Y
Pushed by foreign pressure and the continued defeat of
government forces, Habyarimana signed several peace accords that
provided for power sharing between the MRND(D), RPF and other
the war. He replaced Fred Rwigema, who was killed two days after the invasion,
allegedly by a stray bullet from a fleeing Government soldier. Some still cling to the
now largely discredited theory that he was assassinated by his comrades in the
liberation army over their differences in strategy over the war. Prunier, supra note 67
at 94-95.
79. See David Newburry, Understanding Genocide, 41 AFRICAN STUDIES REv. 80.
80. Id. at 83-84.
81. See generally Prunier, supra note 64; see also A.GUICHAOUA, LES CRISES
POLITIQUES AU RWANDA ET BURUNDI 1995 (1993-1994). (POLITICAL CRISIS IN
RWANDA AND BURUNDI 1995) (1993-1994).
82. Pnmier, supra note 64 at 120.
83. The term Ibyitso, besides being used to refer to Tutsis living in Rwanda,
according to Dr. Ruzindana, an expert witness in Akayesu case, also referred to
moderate Hutus. See Testimony by Dr. Ruzindana in Akayesu's case, Tribunal
transcripts on file at the IC'R in Arusha, (Unpublished), 1997.
84. See Prunier, supra note 64, at 54,138.
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parties.' Habyarimana failed to implement and abide by the accords,
and the MRND(D) and its surrogate parties continued to rule,
excluding the RPF, the most powerful of the opposition group.
On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying President Habyarimana, the
President of Burundi and their high level entourage was hit by two
missiles while approaching Kanombe airport in Kigali, killing all
aboardY7 That same evening, the Interahamwe- (in Kinyarwanda- the
Rwandan language- Those who stand together or those who kill
together) and other militia groups, the Presidential Guard and the
armed forces of Rwanda, assisted by local people, began killing
opposition politicians, human rights activists,' progressive journalists,
85. For the full text of the various peace accords, see Annex I of the letter from
the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting the Ptace Agreement
signed in Arusha on 4 August 1993, the N'Sele Cease Fire Agreement and related
Protocols to the Agreement, A/48/824-S 726195, Dec. 23, 1993. The CDR was
excluded from this power-sharing arrangement.
86. See U.N. DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
RWANDA 1993-1996 (1996).
87. See Roland Sullivan, Juvenal Habyarimana, 57, Ruled Rwarvda for 21 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at A10. Several theories have been forwarded for the crash
of the airplane. Some blame the downing of the plane on extremists in the
President's party MRND, possibly members of the Akazu (the little house), largely
members of the President's family and his wife; this hypothesis has become more
credible. Others blame the RPF which is rather highly improbable because the RPF
battalion was, as per Arusha Accords, confined to the House of the National
Assembly and nowhere in the vicinity. Still other theories point a finger at the
French, who were trying to prop up the demoralized Habyarimana's Armed Forces.
According to Jaana Karhilo, the most widely held view holds the Presidential Guard
responsible for the downing of the President's plane in an attempt to frustrate the
power sharing scheme agreed upon in Arusha between the RPF and Habyarimana's
Government. See Jaana Karilo, Establishment of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, 64 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 683 (1995). While the Presidential Guard may have
been used by some politician or military officer jockeying for power, the Guard itself
or any of its officers did not harbor such ambition. See also Raymond Bonner,
Unsolved Rwanda Mystery: The President's Plane Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994,
at Al; Downing of Rwandan Leader's Plane Stays a Mystery, REUTERS, Apr. 28,
1994.
88. Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the moderate Prime Minster before Jean
Kmabanda took over, well known for her liberal views on matters concerning ethnic
relations, was among those massacred. Her achievements during her short tenure of
office included the abolition of the column specifying ethnic origin in the Identity
Card which had been instituted by Habyarimana's regime despite strong protests by
several human rights organizations. The same day, the 10 members of the Belgian
contingent of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) were
killed by Rwandan forces while protecting the Prime Minister, UNAMIR was
established to monitor the implementation of the cease fire agreement reached
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intellectuals opposed to the oncoming genocide and Tutsis." While
there were sporadic killings earlier, this marked the beginning of the
all out massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
During this period, the government-led killing of Tutsis
intensified. Local people, the Interahaniwe, the armed forces of
Rwanda and the Presidential Guard mobilized during political
meetings. Led by these groups, local people targeted Tutsis,
slaughtered their cows, burned their houses and then killed the
people.' These killings had near uniform features, giving credence to
the theory that they were meticulously planned and executed with the
precision of a military drill*'
In all but one Tutsi commune,' the men, women and children
were herded into sports stadiums, school compounds, churches and
communal halls to be killed with machetes, spears, axes, grenades and
sticks studded with nails. 3 Sometimes the killings were preceded by
between the Habyarimana Government and the RPF in Arusha Accords earlier. See
Security Council resolution establishing UNAMIR for sir-months period and
approving the integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR, SMRES/,-72/1 (1993j, 5 October,
1993 Doc. 24.
89. Within no more than an hour of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard had
set up roadblocks around the capital Kigali and began killing the key members of the
Opposition. See Prunier, supra note 51, at 230-31. The Presidential Guard %%as then
joined by the party militias and the Armed Forces of Rwanda. Within a week, these
forces had kllled an estimated 20,000 people in Kigali and the immediate surrounding
areas. See Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Rwanda, Apr.-May 1994.
90. Expert testimony by Alison Desforges in the Prosecutor v. Jean Paul
Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, Trial transcripts, on file with the Tribunal, Arusha 197. For
the most detailed account of killings, tortures and sexual violence given by the
victims themselves right after the genocide, see African Rights, R,%w.vNDA: DEAMT,
DESPAIR AND DEFAINCE (2d ed. 1995).
91. Several observers and researchers on Rwanda have confirmed that the
genocide was in fact planned at the highest level of authority in Rwanda. See Jean-
Philipe Chr~tien, Comment, le massacre des Titsis a &t orchestri au Rwanda (The
massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda was planned), LE NOUVEAU QUOTIDIEN, Apr. 13,
1994; Jean Chatain, Des Sun'ivants de l'opposition accusent, (The survivors of the
opposition accuse), L'HUmANrrE, May 9, 1994; Keith Richburg, In Rw,'anda, 'Hqhly
Organized" Slaughter, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 9, 1994 Le massacre organize
(The Organized Massacre), JEuNE AFRMQUE, May 12-18, 1994, cited by Prunier, supra
note 64. Prunier cites other sources, supporting the theory that the genocide was not
a spontaneous outburst of popular anger at the death of a beloved President, as
presented by the genocide planners.
92. Only one commune near Kigali out of more than three hundred communes
did not witness massacres, thanks to the bourgenestre. Interview with the
bourgemestre in Kigali (Feb. 1997).
93. Sometimes the victims ran to Churches to seek refuge because in the pre% ious
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cutting the tendons of the feet of the victims to prevent them from
running away; sometimes the killers would take a break or return the
following day to finish off their quarries.'
The Rwandan government's armed forces soon were defeated by
the RPF, and by the end of July 1994, most of the killers fled to
Eastern Zaire (now the Republic of Congo), Tanzania, Burundi,
Cameroon and Kenya.95 The massive and prompt international
response to the plight of the refugees, who regrouped in Zaire and
continued to kill genocide survivors by sending infiltrators to
Rwanda, was aimost in direct contrast to the non-existent effort by
the international community to halt the genocide.
On October 14, 1994, the U.N. Secretary-General estimated that
since April 6, 1994, more than 500,000 people weire killed in
Rwanda.6 Moderate Hutus are estimated to number 10,000 to 30,000
of those killed.' Of the estimated 930,000 Tutsis living in Rwanda
before April 1994, 130,000 survived; this means approximately
800,00098 were killed within three months." There is now a general
killings Churches had become sanctuaries, and those inside were spared. During this
genocide, churches became death traps for the refugees. In some cases priests and
nuns betrayed their heavenly charges and turned the refugees over to the killers or
doused them with kerosene or petrol and set them on fire. See Indictment, Gerald
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICIR-96-10-1 and ICTR-96-17-1.
94. See KEITH B. RICHBURG, OUT OF AMERICA: A BLACK MAN CONFRON"S
AFRICA 90-91 (1997). This was most common in Kibuye, where the Prefect Clement
Kayeshema gathered about forty thousand people and unleashed the killing by
setting an example himself. Kayeshema is now at the U.N. detention facilities in
Arusha where he is being tried for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes
against humanity and violations of Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols. See Indictment, Clement Kayeshema, Case No. ICTR-96-10-1.
95. RICHBURG, supra note 94, at 114.
96. See Emergency Assistance for the Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of Rwanda,
U.N. GAOR Report of the Secretary-General, 49th Sess., 516th mt;,. at 3, U.N. Doc,
A/49/516 (1994).
97. See Prunier, supra note 64, at 265.
98. Id at 264-65.
99. Expert testimony before the First Chamber of the ICTR given by Dr. Alison
Deforges in the case between the Prosecutor and Jean Paul Akayesu, Arusha, 1997.
See transcripts (on file with the Tribunal, Arusha).
While there is a general consensus that the number of the people killed in
Rwanda during the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR (Jan. 1994 to Dec. 1994) is
about 800,000 to a million, many Rwandans disagree with this estimate. The
President of the survivors association-IBUKA-told this author that, based on a
sample survey the Association made in Kibuye, the number exceeds one million. The
figure has recently been revised to 1,364,020 victims, according to the latest issue of
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consensus by Rwanda observers that at least one million people in a
country of 7.5 million were killed between April and July 1994.2 For
these horrendous crimes, only thirty-five persons are indicted by the
ICTR. Of those, twenty-three are at the U.N. detention facility in
Arusha. The Rwandan government is holding about 120,000 other
Rwandan Liberation. Staff Reporter, The Number of Victims of the Genocide
Revised Upwards, RWANDAN LIBERATION, May 18, 1998, at 1. This number was
arrived at followving research conducted by the Rwandan Ministry of Education,
which compiled the identities of those killed commune by commune. This is the most
authoritative figure to date on the number of victims of the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda.
100. The United Nations could have saved many of the victims or possibly even
stopped the genocide if it had not reduced the number of the UNAMIR peace
keeping forces to 270, rendering it ineffective, at a time when the killings were raging
in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda. See Testimony of General Romeo Dallaire-
Commander of the United Nations Forces in Rwanda at the time in Akavesu case
ICTR-96-4-T, March 1998. On file with the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania,
(unpublished) March 1998. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi
Annan, who was then Head of Peace Keeping at the United Nations, recently
admitted that the United Nations had not done enough to save the Tutsis and the
moderate Hutus. See Kofi A. Annan, Strengthening United Nations Action in the
Field of Human Rights: Prospects and Priorities, 10 HARt'. HU%,. RTS. J. 1, 7 (1997).
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, said,
"We are all responsible for this disaster, not only super powers, but also African
countries, non governmental organizations, the entire international community.
There has been a genocide, and the world is talking about what it should do. It is a
scandal." Un Scandal' dont tout le Monde est responsable (A Scandal the Whole
World is Responsible For).
A witness in Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, also testified that while the
U.N. forces were leaving the Ecole Technical Superior (ETO) School compound in
the outskirts of Kigali, where thousands of persons had taken refugee thinking the
U.N. forces will protect them, the interahaniwe and the Presidential Guards mowed
down men, women and children right under the nose of the United Nations. The
Commander of the UNAMIR at the time, a Canadian, General Romeo Dallaire, with
tears in his eyes, testified in Arusha in the Akayesu case as a defense witness %here
he confirmed that it would have been possible to save thousands of people, if not stop
the genocide altogether, had the force under his command not been stripped to 270
soldiers and their mission changed. See Testimony of General Romeo Dallaire, in
the Prosecutor v. Akayesu case, ICTR-96-4-T (unpublished transcript on file with the
Tribunal, Arusha, March 1998).
It would be interesting to examine the legal responsibility of the diplomats
who made the reckless decision to radically reduce the peace keeping force to a mere
270 soldiers and change its mission rendering it incapable of defending the
population. Surely, near antiquated doctrines such as diplomatic immunity or act of
state could be dispensed with in the face of genocide.
For a comprehensive review of the failure of the United Nations in Rwanda,
see the five-volume report of the United Nations, Joint Evaluation of Emergency
Assistance to Rwanda, the International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons
from the Rwanda Experience (1996).
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people allegedly involved in the killings. About four hundred people
have been tried in Rwandan courts; several were found guilty and
sentenced to death"' or imprisonment."2
C. Similarities and Differences
The massacres, tortures and persecutions in Ethiopia and
Rwanda have similarities and differences. In both countries, the
victims were not formally charged with any crimes nor given their day
in court. Government forces and the militia carried out the massacres
with the knowledge and approval of the authorities. While the Tutsis
were massacred solely because they were Tutsis, the Ethiopian
victims were killed because they opposed military rule and its
policies. Furthermore, in both cases, the killings were politically and
ideologically motivated. In Rwanda the killings were carried out to
establish a homogeneous ethnic power through ethnic cleansing; in
Ethiopia the killings took place for political domination and
imposition of a political ideology on all society.
In Rwanda and Ethiopia, killings were meticulously planned by
government authorities who used the armed forces and militia to
execute their plans. In both countries, the killings were ideologically
justified. In Rwanda the Tutsis were painted as foreign intruders and
exploiters who kept the Hutu majority in bondage. In Ethiopia the
victims were portrayed as class enemies who should be liquidated per
the dictates of Marxist-Leninism, the ideology officially adopted by
the government.
Both the new Rwandan and Ethiopian governments, as a matter
of policy, decided to try the leaders of these killings in a court of law.
As stated earlier, Ethiopian authorities filed charges against 5,198
individuals.0 3 Out of seventy-three top Derg-WPE leaders indicted at
the First Criminal Division of the Ethiopian Court in Addis Ababa,
forty-seven are being tried for genocide, crimes against humanity and
other crimes in the alternative." The ICTR, on the other hand, only
101. Rwandan authorities on April 24, 1998 publicly executed twenty-two persons,
who had been tried, convicted of genocide and condemned to death by the High
Court of Rwanda; their appeals were found to be meritless. Among these, Frodwlad
Karimara was the most senior in the custody of the Rwandese authorities. See infra
note 171.
102. See supra note 19, at 3.
103. See Transitional Government of Ethiopia, supra note 42.
104. Oyvind Aadland & Knut Rognlien, Report on the Observation of the "Derg
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arrested thirty-five individuals.
It is quite disturbing, however, that the rich, powerful, and
arguably the most culpable masterminds of the genocide in Rwanda
are being tried by the ICTR, are represented by the best lawyers, and
while awaiting trial enjoy conditions in detention a middle-class
African bureaucrat would envy.' On the other hand, the poor, who
may have been duped or forced to commit the crimes they are
accused of (which of course is no excuse), are being tried in some
cases with little or no legal representation and held under abhorrent
conditions while they await trial." The Ethiopian suspects, on the
other hand, are being tried by a national court with all the legal
resources the country has, guaranteeing equal justice or injustice, as
the case may be, poor or rich.' 7
I. Establishment of the Ethiopian Office of the Special
Prosecutor
The alleged crimes of the former leaders of Ethiopia were of a
kind unknown in Ethiopian judicial history and the focus of national
and international attention. The Ethiopian government chose to
bypass the existing judicial structure and established the Office of the
Special Public Prosecutor (SPO) exclusively to handle the human
rights violations that took place during the Derg-WPE rule between
1974 and 1991. In addition to investigation and prosecution, the
objective of the SPO is "to record for posterity the brutal offenses
[and] the embezzlement of property perpetrated against the people of
Ethiopia and to educate the people and make them aware of those
offenses in order to prevent the recurrence of such a system of
government.""'
The then-transitional government of Ethiopia established the
SPO by Proclamation,' giving the SPO "the power to conduct
investigation and institute proceedings in respect of any person
Trial" in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Trial of the Former Ethiopian Government QOfIcials
Before the First Division of the Central High Court of the Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia (Feb. 7-20 and Apr. 15- May 2, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author and the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights).




109. Proclamation No. 2211992, Negarit Gazeta, No. 18, 1992.
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having committed or responsible for the commission of an offense"'
by abusing his position in the party, the government or mass
organizations under the Derg-WPE regime."". The SPO must
conduct prompt investigations and bring to trial detainees who were
arrested when the EPRDF assumed control of the country on May 8,
1991, as well as those responsible for committing offenses who are
still at large."' The investigation and prosecution is directed against
the higher officials of the Derg-WPE, members of the security and
armed forces, representatives of urban-dweller and peasant
associations, and other persons associated with the commission of
crimes referred to as "gross oppression, heinous and horrendous
criminal acts."".3
Neither the Proclamation creating the SPO nor any other statute
designates a special court for trying these persons. Thus, jurisdiction
was determined by Article 4 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure
Code of 1961, which assigns jurisdiction to various courts."4 The High
Court of Ethiopia, the highest first-instance and appellate court, has
jurisdiction to try charges of genocide and crimes against humanity,
which Derg officials allegedly committed. Appeal from the High
Court goes to the Supreme Court of Ethiopia, the highest court in the
country."'
The Ethiopian government assigned the First Chamber of the
Criminal Division of the Central High Court to try Derg-WPE
officials. This Court seems to have all the trappings of a special
tribunal including: special judges sitting at a different site from the
110. The Proclamation establishing the Office of the Special Prosecutor does not
limit the prosecution to violations of international humanitarian law. See id.
111. Id. at art. 6.
112 Id. at Preamble.
113. Id. at Preamble.
114. See "First Schedule", ETHIOPIA CRIM. P. CODE p. 57-68. Under the
Schedule there are four categories of courts with jurisdiction allocated according to
the severity of the crime they are expected to try. The lowest court is the Wereda
Court with a right of appeal to Awraja Court which is also a first instance Court. The
High Court, which is an appeal Court as well as the highest first instance court, takes
appeals from the Awraja and Woreda Courts. The court of last resort is the Supreme
Court of Ethiopia with appellate jurisdiction only. See ETHIOPIA CRIM. P. CODE of
1961 arts. 181,182.
115. The former unitary state of Ethiopia has now been restructured along ethnic
lines to constitute nine states which are federated to form the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia. The courts have therefore been reorganized to reflect the
federal structure. See ETH. CONSr. (Dec. 8, 1994) arts. 1, 50.
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High Court premises, unprecedented national and international
media coverage, international observers sitting in the public gallery
and defendants invoking untested provisions of Ethiopian law. Trials
of other minor Derg officials are underway in the State supreme
courts of the different regions delegated by the Central Federal High
Court.
11 6
The qualifications necessary for appointment of the Special
Prosecutor are set out in Article 5 of the Proclamation."" The Special
Prosecutor must be an Ethiopian citizen, faithful to the transitional
charter"' and either trained in law, or have broad legal skills acquired
through experience. The candidate must be distinguished through
diligence, integrity and good conduct-all inchoate qualifications
difficult to ascertain.11 9 In addition, the candidate must not have
participated in the offenses he will prosecute-an obvious attempt to
forestall the possible defense of ti quoue, which could have been
raised by the defense. Finally, the candidate must have not been a
member of the Derg-WPE.','
116. See Red Terror Suspects Appear at the Oronia High Court, ADDIS ZEN, E'".
Apr. 13,1998 (translation from the Amharic by author).
117. See Proclamation, supra note 120, Article 5.
118. The Transitional Charter purports to espouse certain controversial principles,
especially those guaranteeing the right of secession to nations, nationalities and
peoples. While proponents of this principle argue that such a provision will help
preserve Ethiopian unity, opponents argue that it will put that unity in serious
jeopardy. This provision has been incorporated into the 1996 Constitution under
Article 39, which states:
Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has unconditional right to
self-determination, including the right to secession.
The subsequent provisions lay out the procedure by which secession may
be effected. This provision compromises the independence of the Prosecutor
and excludes many Ethiopians from qualifying for the post of the Special
Prosecutor, because unlike the EPRDF, many believe that such a provision may
be a recipe for tearing the country apart. See Transitional Period Charter of
Ethiopia. Proclamation No.1/1991, Negarit Gazeta, No. 1, July 22, 1991.
119. Todd Howland points out that the SPO was rocked by internal difficulties,
relating to changes in personnel brought about by conflict with the Head of the SPO.
See Todd Howland, Improving Human Rights by Harmonizing International
Interventions: The Lesson from the Carter Center's Intervention vith the Office of
the Special Prosecutor of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, A New Role for
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
120. When the EPRDF captured Addis Ababa, it dismantled most Government
institutions, including the military, the police and the court system. Accordingly, the
EPRDF Government dismissed many judges and barred other judicial personnel
from working for the new Government, allegedly because they N~ere members of the
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The Special Prosecutor and his deputies were appointed by the
President with the approval of the Council of Representatives (the
national assembly) upon the recommendation of the Prime
Minister.12 ' The Special Prosecutor is "accountable to the Prime
Minster of the Transitional Government."'" He apparently holds the
rank of Minister, which can be ascertained by his signalure affixed to
the indictments; however, there is nothing in the Proclamation that
designates him a Minister.
The Proclamation does not address the Special Prosecutor's
independence in discharging his prosecutorial functions. It does not
spell out what particular offenses the SPO should prosecute, although
it is quite specific about who should be prosecuted. The Proclamation
merely identifies as "offenses" the crimes Derg-WPE officials and
others allegedly committed. As far as the Proclamation is concerned,
those officials targeted for prosecution could be charged with crimes
ranging from petty theft to genocide and crimes against humanity.
The generic term "offense" does not indicate the special nature of the
alleged Derg-WPE crimes. The only indication of the seriousness of
the crimes the SPO is expected to prosecute is a reference to the
"heinous and horrendous criminal acts and abuse of power in the
Party."' ' This is a far cry from the very explicit provision of the
ICTR Statute that charges the Prosecutor with "prosecuting persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law.'
24
Workers' Party of Ethiopia and/or were in the service of the Government during the
Derg rule. This deprived the bar and the bench of a highly trained and experienced
pool of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, investigators and other judicial personnel; it was
also an affront to judicial independence, although judicial independence has not been
a hallmark of the Ethiopian judicial system as discussed below. Nonetheless the
EPRDF has enacted a proclamation providing for the independence of the judiciary.
See Proclamation 23/1992, No. 19, 8'h August 1992.
121. See Proclamation, supra note 120, arts. 3,4.
122. Id. at art. 1.
123. Id. at art. 5.
124. See ICTR Statute, supra note 4, at arts. 1-4.
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IV. Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda
Following reports1" by human rights organizations, the
international media and various U.N. agencies regarding a large-scale
massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus by Hutu extremists and
elements of the Habyarimana Government,"" the U.N. Security
Council established an impartial commission of experts to examine
possible violations of humanitarian laws, including whether genocide
occurred during the 1994 massacres in Rwanda.'
Information supplied by the commission, the then-newly-
appointed U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights Jose Ayala Lasso.
and the Special Rapporteur Rene Degni Seguil' strongly confirmed
that the massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus constituted genocide
and that the massacres were carried out "in a concerted, planned,
systematic and methodical way."1" At the same time, the commission
of experts recommended that the U.N. Security Council do all that it
could to bring the individuals responsible for the massacre to justice
in an impartial and independent criminal tribunal.': As late as April
1994, the U.N. Security Council adamantly avoided characterizing the
massacres in Rwanda as "genocide""' because such a characterization
125. See, eg., African Rights. Rwanda, Who is dying, What is to be done?: A
discussion Paper (May 1994); Amnesty International, Rw'anda: Mass Murder by
Government Supporters and Troops in April and May 1994(1994).
126. See Guy VASSAL-ADAMS, RWANDA: AN AGENDA FOR INTERN X-IU\_tNL
AcTIoN (1994); Robert Block, The Tragedy of Rwanda, N.Y. RE,. BuoKs. Oct. 21.
1994, at 3; HUIAN RIGHTS WATCH AFRICA, GENOCIDE IN RW ANDA: APRIL & Mv~
1994 (1994); Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Sitttations and Rcp#*rt' 44
Special Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situations of Human Rights i Rtanda,.
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 508th mtg. at 5-7. U.N. Doc. A149150 (1944): Deni-Setui
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission of Human Rights, Commission Resolution E(CNAS-3'1 of May 134.4
51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, para 28. U.N. Doe. EICN.4t 1995i7 1t9941.
127. See S.C. Res 935, U.N. SCOR, 3400th mtg. at 1-2. U.N. Dov.t; SRES, '35
(1994).
128. See U.N. Doe. A14915081Add.lIS1199411557 at 7.
129. See U.N. Doc. EICN.41S-31 (1994).
130. Degni-Segui Report, supra note 126.
131. Id.
132. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Letter dated October 1. 1994 from the Secr,:tary-
General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S.C. at 2, U.N. Doi c.
S1199411125 (1994).
133. See A.B. Pour, MI. Boutros Ghali propose a l'ONU tine action mihitaire int
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would require it to take action to halt the massacres as mandated by
the Genocide Convention.
However, on two previous occasions the U.N. Security Council
had decided that the combination of killings, tortures, refugees, and
displacement of citizens constituted a threat to international peace
and security.M Therefore, following the recommendation of the
commission, the U.N. Security Council, with the active participation
of the new Rwandan government, 135 established the ICTR.Y' Under
Rwanda, LE MONDE, May 1994, at 5.
134. See S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 3377th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994)
(Security Council Resolution expanding UNAMIR to 5,500 troops. and mandating
UNAMIR II to provide security to displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk
and imposing arms embargo); see also S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 3392nd mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994) (Security Council Resolution invoking Chapter VII of
the (UN) Charter, authorizing Member States to conduct multinational operation
for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to strength).
135. On October 29, 1993, Rwanda was elected to the Security Council revolving
seat for a two-year term which began on January 1, 1994, despite the repeated
warnings by Rwandan and international human rights organizations that
Habyarimana's Government was engaged in gross violations of human rights. That
same year, Habyarimana's Government unleashed the genocide and crimes against
humanity. See U.N. Doc. GA/Dec./48/306 (1993).
136. See Security Council Resolution, supra note 4. Several persons
knowledgeable on the workings of the United Nations allege that the Rwandan
genocide would have been dismissed as one of those cases of tribal blood letting so
common in Africa and the ICTR would not have been established if it was not
preceded by the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to ICTY). In fact Judge Loui;e Arbour, the
Prosecutor, explaining the cause of the genocide to a visitor at the ICTR, has
reportedly said that this was how Africans have traditionally settled their conflicts.
The fact that the United Nations has not investigated the previous large scale killing
of Tutsis in 1959, 1963, 1966, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 gives some credence to
these allegations. Four respected human rights organizations had in 1993, for
example, issued a report suggesting that the massacre of the Tutsis in 1993
constituted genocide. See RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE, D'
ENQOETE SUR LES VIOLATIONS DES DROITS DE L' HOMME AU RWANDA DEPUIS LE lER
OCTOBRE 1990 (7-21 JANVIER 1993) (REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY ON THE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE OCTOBER 1990) RAPPORT
FINAL, (Final Report), March 1993 at 96; see also U.N. ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, 50th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. EICN.41 1994/7/Add.1
(1993) (B.W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his Mission to Rwanda on April 8-17,
1993).
Theodor Meron wrote, "[W]ithout the Yugoslav precedent, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda would not have been established to prosecute those
responsible for the genocidal violence that swept the nation [Rwanda]." Theodor
Meron, Answering War Crimes, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 1.
In the scant media coverage given to ICIR trials, in tha allocation of
resources by the United Nations as well as by private and public donors, the ICTR
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the power granted to it by chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, " the U.N.
Security Council created the ICTR to prosecute persons responsible
for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian laws committed in the territory of Rwanda.' In
addition, the ICTR is responsible for prosecuting Rwandan citizens"'
comes nowhere close to the ICTY.
The ICTR Statute is almost a verbatim copy of the ICTY Statute, and the
ICTR was made to share the Prosecutor who was first appointed to head the ICTY
based at the Hague with occasional two to three day visits to Kigali. The Statute of
the ICTR was hastily produced and took into consideration neither Rwanda's unique
situation nor the socio-economic level of Rwandan society. The second prosecutor's
knowledge and experience in Africa did not extend beyond three day visits to South
Africa to attend a seminar on Truth and Reconciliation. The Rwandese people have
been very critical of the second prosecutor and certain aspects of the Tribunal while
at the same time they believe that the Tribunal is useful at least to apprehend those
suspects the Rwandan Government cannot reach. In 1997, the license plates of the
Tribunal vehicles were made more anonymous, because of concerns about the safety
of tribunal staff members vis-A-vis the general public, which at times had manifested
hostilities towards them.
The attitude of the Rwandese people towards the trials has b.en one of
indifference, if not outright hostility. "In Kigali, and a fortiori in the Rwandese
country sides, nobody follows the activities of the Tribunal. ... Except for
occasional bitter criticisms of the Tribunal, the media almost never talks about it."
Remy Ourdan, Un tribunal loin du Rwanda, LE MONDE, Apr. 4, 1998, at 1 (translated
from the French by the author). A leader of IBUKA complained, "We do not
believe that the judges have good intentions. Perhaps they are pre-occupied with
procedures rather than judgment." Id. (translated from the French by the author).
137. See S.C. Res. SOS, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SIRESISOS, 34-35 (1993).
138. See S.C. Res. 995, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. U.N. Doe. SRESf
955 (1994).
139. It is not clear why the in personan jurisdiction of the Tribunal was limited to
Rwandan citizens when, and if, the crime was committed in neighboring states. Nor
is it clear why the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal was limited to Rwanda and
neighboring states. One may aid and abet genocide while not necessarily being either
in the territory of Rwanda, or a Rwandan. A European could, for example, supply
weapons for the commission of the crime while in Europe. The tra vax preparatoire
does not shed light on either issue. It should, however, be remembered that France,
a member of the Security Council, gave logistic, military, and diplomatic support to
Habyarimana's Government, while certain elements of Habyarimana's Government
massacred Tutsis and moderate Hutus with weapons and training provided by the
French Government. This fact may have prompted the international medical relief
organization Medicin sans Frontiers, together with prominent French academics and
human rights activists, to call upon the French Parliament to investigate the role of
the French Government in the Rwandan genocide of 1990-1994. See MSF Calls For
Enquiry on French GovL Role in Genocide, AFRICA NEws, March 17, 1994. In this
investigation, the role of President Mitterand's son, Christophe Mitterand, should
figure prominently, for he ran African Affairs at the Elysee Palace. He is quoted to
have said, "We are going to send him a few boys, old man Habyarimana. We are
going to bail him out. In any case, the whole thing will be over in two or three
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accused of genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian laws committed in the territory of neighboring States
during 1994.
The establishment of the ICTR was preceded by a debate at the
U.N. Security Council initiated by the RPF-led Rwandan
government. The debate focused on whether those implicated in the
1994 genocide should be prosecuted in a national criminal court or
international court established solely for that purpose.."" Initially,
domestic courts were considered, but they were quickly abandoned.
The Rwandan representative did not want domeslic courts to
prosecute the cases because he believed that would result in the cases
only having a local impact, blurring the international character of the
crimes."' The representatives of the other countries also believed
that domestic courts would only issue summary reprisals against the
defendants, blocking the possible return of potentially more than two
million refugees.
However, there was no unanimous agreement for establishing an
ad hoc tribunal to sit in judgment of criminal matters. China, as a
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, abstained, 1' and
representatives from several other countries opposed the
establishment of the tribunal by fiat of the U.N. Security Council.
14
Opponents argued that it was an ultra vires act of the powers of the
U.N. Security Council. The Brazilian envoy, for example, argued that
"[tihe Security Council's responsibilities lie not in the judicial or
institution building field, but in the maintenance of international
peace and security. ' 141 Several States preferred to establish the
Tribunal by a treaty that would be adopted by member States. In
months." Prunier, supra note 64 at 100-01. If the French or Zairean officials closely
allied to Habyarimana were not excluded from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, they
could possibly be indicted under Article 6 of the Statute, which holds responsible
those who abet and aid in the planning, preparing or executing of the crimes referred
to by the Statute. Hopefully the investigation recently launched by the OAU will
shed some light on these issues. See generally <http://www. africanew,;.org.>
140. U.N. Doc.S/1994/1125/ (1994) at 30. para.148.
141. For further elaboration on the objections of the Rwandese Envoy, see,
Madelaine Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The case of Rwanda, 7
DuKE J. COMP.&INT'L L, 349, 353-357 (1997).
142. See U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125/
143. Id.
144. See U.N. SCOR 49' Session, 3453'd Meeting, at 9, U.N.: Doc. t3/PV. 3453.
145. Id.
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response, U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
argued:
[Tihe treaty approach incurs the disadvantage of requiring
considerable time to establish an instrument and then to achieve
the required number of ratifying nations for entry into force. Even
then there can be no guarantee that ratification will be received
from these States which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be
truly representatie.
Among several arguments favoring trial of the genocide suspects
by an international tribunal were:
[Trial by an international tribunal] would deter future massacres;
[the tribunal] would be staffed by experts able to apply and
interpret evolving international law standards; be made likely to
have the requisite resources at its disposal; function on the basis of
independence and impartiality; advance the development and
enforcement of international criminal norms; and have greater
chance than Rwandan Courts for obtaining jurisdiction on those
persons who are no longer in Rwanda.47
The Rwandan government also argued that their judicial system was
completely destroyed by the genocide" and requested the U.N.
Security Council establish an international criminal tribunal to sit in
Rwanda in judgment of those suspected of genocide, crimes against
humanity and violating various Geneva Conventions."'
Even though the Rwandan representative favored an international
tribunal, he objected to various provisions of the Statute that would
be used to try actual cases. Some of the issues were never fully
resolved and remain a bone of contention between the Tribunal and
Rwandan authoritiesY1 The objections centered on the temporal
146. Id.
147. U.N. Doc. S/1994/11251 (1994) at 30.
148. According to the Report by the United States Institute for Peace, prior to the
genocide there were 300 judges in the appellate courts and 500 in the provincial
courts. See Inst. for Peace, Special Report, Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes
and Genocide (1994) at 15.
149. See U.N. Doc. S11994/1115 (1994) (letter dated 28 September 1494 from the
Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council).
150. Id.
151. The negative attitude of the Rwandese authorities towards the Tribunal can
partly be traced to these objections when the Tribunal was first established. and
subsequently all unfriendly relations with the Prosecutor Mrs. Louise Arbour. See
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jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which only covered crimes committed in
1994."' According to the Rwandan representative, this limited
temporal jurisdiction does not cover the crimes that precipitated the
genocide. Other areas of contention included the punishment article
and the decision to headquarter the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania. The
punishment provision only provided for imprisonment, while the
Rwandan Penal Code authorized the death penalty for the kind of
crimes genocide suspects allegedly committed."' Arusha was chosen
as the seat and headquarters of the Tribunal because the U.N.
Security Council believed it was a neutral territory.'" This was
vehemently opposed5' by the Rwandan representative, because he
believed that the deterrent effect of the trial and punishment will be
lost if the trials were to be held hundreds of miles away from the
scene of the crime with no knowledge of the Rwandese people.
In the end, only the Rwandan representative voted against the
adoption of the Resolution and Statute establishing the Tribunal.'
However, once the U.N. Security Council approved the Resolution
and Statute, the Rwandan government promised to support the ICTR
and cooperate with its tasks.
A. Jurisdiction of the U.N. Security Council to Establish the ICTR
Whether the U.N. Security Council is empowered under chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter-which provides for the maintenance of
world peace and security-to establish a criminal tribunal for
prosecuting persons responsible for violations of international
humanitarian laws was adjudicated in the Tadic case at the
letter written by the R-wandese Envoy to the United Nations requesting the
separation of the ICTR from the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, circa
May 1997.
152 See ICTR Statute, supra note 4, at art. 7.
153. See Arts. 26 & 312 (premeditated murder) of the Rwandan Penal
Code, Decree-Law NO. 21/77 of 18 August 1977, Journal officiel de la Republique
rwandaise, 1 July 1978 (Official Journal of the Republique of Rwanda), 1, July 1978.
154. See S/RES/977 (1995) (February 22, 1995). Arusha was selected after Kenya
turned down the request to provide a seat for the tribunal. See Comprehensive
report of the Secretary-General on practical arrangements for the effective
functioning of the ICTR recommending Arusha as the seat of the Tribunal.
S/1995/134, February 13, 1995.
155. For other objections forwarded by the Rwandan Envoy, see Madeline H.
Morris, supra note 141.
156. For further elaboration on the objections of the Rwandese Envoy, see id.
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International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).Y" The power
of the U.N. Security Council was challenged by the defense in a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction." The Trial Chamber ruled
that the issue was a political question, and hence non-justiciable.'
The Appeals Chamber disagreed with the Trial Chamber and ruled
that the establishment of the ICTY by the U.N. Security Council was
indeed a jurisdictional question that the Tribunal could properly
review.6°
The Appeals Chamber ruled that the establishment of the
Tribunal fell "squarely within the powers of the Security Council
under Article 41 [of the U.N. Charter]" because it is a function of
maintenance of international peace and security, and the atrocities
committed in former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international
peace and security as stated in chapter VII of the U.N. Charter."I A
similar attack on the jurisdiction of the ICTR was asserted in the
Kanyabashi case.2 On the basis of the same argument forwarded in
Tadi, the Second Trial Chamber of the ICTR, in a unanimous
decision, quashed the challenge and re-affirmed the legality of the
establishment of the Tribunal by the U.N. Security Council.'






162. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-9-15-T. Unpublished,
(1995).
163. The challenge to jurisdiction is the only ground for which interlocutory
appeal is allowed, (See Rule 72(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
Defense has given notice to the Chamber and this author (who argued the issue on
behalf of the Prosecutor) that they will appeal the decision. As the two Tribunals
share the appeals Chamber, see ICTR Statute, supra note 5, at art. 12(2), the Appeals
Chamber at the Hague will not reverse itself on exactly the same issue. It is not clear
why the defense would appeal a matter that has already been resolved by the
Appeals Chamber, especially when he made no attempt to distinguish the issues and
the facts between the two cases. The question whether res judicata holds, when the
cases have not been distinguished, must be confronted sooner or later. Otherwise the
Trial Chambers of both Tribunals may come up with conflicting decisions on matters
which may be identical. Also, every objection on jurisdiction may have to be litigated
and eventually appealed in every case, thus wasting valuable judicial resources and
unnecessarily dragging out the cases.
In quashing the challenge to jurisdiction, the 2nd Trial Chamber gave
"[consideration] to the decision of August 10, 1995 of the trial Chamber of the ICTY
in Case No. IT-94-I-T, The Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadic, and the decision of 2 October
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The territorial, temporal and subject matter jurisdiction of the
Tribunal is set forth in Articles 1 through 8 of the Statute. The
territorial jurisdiction of the ICTR covers the territory of Rwanda,
including land and airspace, as well as neighboring States.."'
The Tribunal's temporal jurisdiction permits the prosecution of
crimes committed during 1994. This choice of dates seems rather
arbitrary because the acts that led to the violations of the
international humanitarian law were planned and occurring well
before January 1994. The limitation of temporal jurisdiction to these
dates presents problems for the prosecution and defense because it
raises the question of the admissibility of acts that took place prior to
January 1994 (e.g., meetings held prior to January 1, 1994 tending to
prove genocide). This question awaits resolution by judicial ruling."'
The Rwandan government also objected to the extension of temporal
jurisdiction beyond July 1994, ostensibly to forestall investigations of
international humanitarian law violations by its troops.'
M
The Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction covers various crimes
involving genocide, including conspiracy to commit gertocide, direct
and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit
genocide and complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity and
violations of article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
1995 rendered by Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Case No. IT-94-I-AR 72, on
appeal of the said decision of the Trial Chamber." This however doe; not resolve the
possibility of the two tribunals handing down conflicting decisions on exactly the
same issues.
164. There has not yet been judicial ruling on the issue and the travaux
preparatoire do not indicate which countries are the ones referred to by the Statute as
"neighboring states". If the reference is to only the riparian states with Rwanda, the
Statute may leave out important criminal activities which may have taken place in
Kenya; some prominent Kenyans had long-term, cordial relations with the Rwandan
genocidal regime of Habyarimana's Government, including alleged joint-ownership
of a weapons factory in Kenya. There is a distinct possibility that thes.. weapons were
manufactured for the use in the genocide, with the knowledge of the Kenyan
partners. See Prunier, supra note 64 at 98.
165. See ICTR Statute, Arts. 2,3,4.
166. During testimony Dr. Alison Desforges, an expert witness on the Akayesu
case, responded to a question whether, in her opinion, the RPF could be accused of
committing genocide during this period. She answered that there was overwhelming
evidence that RPF soldiers indeed killed many Hutus. But she added that these
killings were not carried out as a matter of RPF policy which encouraged the killing
of Hutus as such. While these large-scale killings may have been committed by rogue
soldiers, they could not be characterized as genocidal acts. See transcript of Akayesu
trial, 1997 (on file at the Tribunal in Arusha, 1997); see also Jaana Karhilo, supra note
90, at 699.
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Protocol ll." These are all part of customary international
humanitarian law. Drafters of the Statute placed special emphasis on
the subject matter of the Tribunal, in order to hold closely the
Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction to the well-known and accepted
doctrines of international humanitarian law."'  Limiting subject
matter to accepted doctrines protects the Statute from being attacked
on the basis of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla pena sina lege.
The ICTR and Rwandan national courts have concurrent
jurisdiction 69 to prosecute persons identified in the Statute for crimes
stipulated in Articles 2, 3 and 4. The wording of the Statute is
misleading because it gives the false impression that the U.N. Security
Council assigned jurisdiction to Rwandan courts. In reality, the
Tribunal shares jurisdiction with Rwandan national courts and has
primacy over all courts, presumably including Rwandan courts. At
any stage of investigation or prosecution, it may demand that national
courts defer to its competence.""
If Rwanda had the wherewithal to render a fair trial that could
withstand an international test of fairness, it would be better for all
the trials to occur in Rwanda. This would help eradicate impunity
and bring about reconciliation. The Tribunal's assertion of
jurisdiction over Rwandan citizens is an exception to the customary
international law doctrine of jus de non evocado and therefore should
be used sparingly. The Tribunal should assume jurisdiction only over
those the Rwandan courts could not lay their hands on or those the
Tribunal believes would not receive fair justice in Rwanda. The main
purpose of the primacy of the ICTR's jurisdiction is to forestall any
refusal by the government to deliver a suspect to the Tribunal
allegingjus de non evocado.
By its temporary nature and structure, the Tribunal was
established only to try the few genocide leaders and other violators of
international humanitarian law. If the Tribunal insisted on trying all
persons who absconded the country after committing these crimes
who all happen to be rich and powerful, it would send a dangerous
message that only the rich are entitled to justice of the kind rendered
167. See ICTR Statute, Articles 2,3,4.
168. See D. Sharga & R. Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 EURO. J. INTr'L L 360, 363 (1994).
169. See ICTR Statute, art. 8 (1).
170. Id. art. 8(2).
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by the ICTR, which is superior to the ones rendered in ithe Rwandan
courts as discussed below.71
B. Jurisdiction of the Ethiopian Central High Court over Those
Accused
It is inherent in the concept of sovereignty that the Ethiopian
government, regardless of its political ideology, has jurisdiction over
its citizens for acts committed by those citizens and others (except for
some special cases sanctioned by public international law) within its
territory." These principles are codified in the several articles of the
Criminal Code. The specific temporal jurisdiction of the SPO to try
cases was established by the Proclamation!1 "
Under international agreement, an affirmative duty to prosecute
and punish human rights violations committed by members of the
previous government arises if investigations confirm Ihat the acts
allegedly committed by the previous government leaders and
operatives can be characterized as genocide.'74 If the crimes are
171. Justice Goldstone, as the Prosecutor at the time, made the legally correct and
politically astute decision to refuse to request the Ethiopian Government to turn over
Karamira (who was in the government's custody), despite pressure from human right
organizations. Frodwald Karamira was the Vice President of the Movement
Democratique Republicain until he broke away to form a Tutsi-baiting splinter
group within the Party, know as MDR- Power. He became a vanguard of the
extremist Hutu theoreticians who publicly agitated for the extermination of Tutsis.
While he was trying to enter India without a visa, he was arrested and put on
Ethiopian Airlines which was bound for Kigali via Addis Ababa. He was again
arrested by the Ethiopian security personnel when he tried to sneak out of the airport
at Addis Ababa without a visa. After he was sent back to Kigali by the Ethiopian
authorities, he was assisted by counsel and tried in Kigali. He was found guilty and
sentenced to death. His appeal was rejected by the Appeals court of Rwanda and his
request for clemency was also rejected by the Rwandan Cabinet. With 22 others
convicted of genocide, he was publicly executed amidst jeers from the onlookers who
recognized him. It is widely believed that Karamira himself was a Tutsi, which he did
not deny in court during his trial. It is the irony of the genocide that some the most
virulent Tutsi-haters were themselves Tutsis. Like Karamira they had their identity
cards changed to that of Hutu because of the successive persecutions of Tutsis.
Robert Kajuka, the President of the dreaded interahamwe stands out as the most
infamous among these people. See, Prunier, supra note 64 at 241. K ,ramira was the
highest Rwandan Official to be tried by the Rwandan Courts. As the leader of the
extremist faction of the of the Mouvement Democratique Republicain party,
Karamira was the highest official to be tried by the Rwandan Court,.. See, Prunier,
supra note 64, at 183.
172. See ETHIOPIA CRIM. CODE, arts. 5, 11.
173. See Proclamation 22/1992, supra note 92.
174. See Genocide Conv., supra note 3, arts. V, VI. The duty of the Government
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anything less than that, as defense attorneys contended in preliminary
objections, the duty to prosecute is not as clear. While wholesale
immunity is discouraged as being illegal abdication of the
government's international responsibility, "' some experts caution
against relying on international law as a justification for prosecution
for a variety of reasons."" Others are even more categorical in
rejecting the notion that international law imposes an affirmative
duty on governments to prosecute human rights violations. At least
one commentator maintains that "the Convention Against Torture,
several U.N. resolutions, declarations and principles and occasional
comments by experts ... are simply insufficient evidence for asserting
that customary international law now requires punishment of human
rights violations." 77
However, there seems to be consensus among human rights
lawyers that "while there may be room for governmental discretion in
dealing with the perpetrators of lesser crimes, gross abuses such as
genocide, torture, disappearance and extra-judicial or summary
executions must always be criminally prosecuted and punished."'" In
fact, international law obligates governments to bring to justice
persons who participated "in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary
executions in any territory under their jurisdiction .... Governments
shall either bring such persons to justice or cooperate to extradite any
such persons to other countries vishing to exercise jurisdiction.' '
to prosecute should not be limited to its protagonists only. Any member of insurgent
groups who presently may be in or out of power, who investigations show that he or
she has violated the eminent rights of the kinds stated above should also be
prosecuted to the full extent of the law as the African National Congress has done
against some rogue elements within its ranks. See Juan Mendez, Symposium:
Transitions to Democracy and Rule of Law, 5 AM. UJ. LNT'L L. & POL'Y 965 (199).
175. See Hurst Hannun, Synpositwn: "Transition to Democracy and the Rule of
Law", 5 AM. UJ. INT'LL. & PoL'Y 956 (1990).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Nigel Rodley, Symposiun Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1044 (1990).
179. The Ethiopian Government has requested the Government of Zimbabwe
several times to extradite the former President of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile-Mariam.
Possibly the majority of atrocities in Ethiopia were committed under his leadership,
at his explicit orders. The Zimbabwean Government has not heeded the Ethiopian
Government's requests, and its refusal to extradite Mengistu contradicts
international law. Although the criminal acts Mengistu is indicted for may be
politically motivated and thus appear to be exempt from prosecution under
international law, this political exception does not apply to crimes involving genocide,
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Amnesty, pardon or neglect of these crimes, even for the sake of
national reconciliation, would be tantamount to the abrogation of
responsibility by the government in power.O
Unless States independently meet their legal obligation to
extradite or prosecute those Ethiopians living abroad who were
indicted for genocide and other war crimes by the SPO, there is very
little the SPO can do to secure these individuals. The ICTR, on the
other hand, does not face such problems because it enjoys the backing
of the U.N. Security Council, whose resolutions are binding on all
States and their agencies. To date, all orders issued by the ICTR
have been enforced by governments and their agencies with the
exception of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas, which refused
to enforce the indictment and extradition of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana
who moved to Texas.
181
V. Designation of the ICTR Prosecutor
The prosecutor of the ICTY also serves as the ICTR
prosecutor,"" after being nominated by the U.N. Secretary-General
crimes against humanity, or war crimes. See e.g., Geneva Convention, supra note 5,
at art. 49 (duty to search for and prosecute or extradite) and 50 (rccognition as a
crime); see Tore Engelschion, Prosecution of War Crime Violations of Human Rights
in Ethiopia, 8 Yearbook of African Law, 52 (1994).
The real reason behind Mugabe's refusal to hand over Mengsitu to Ethiopian
authorities to face his accusers is Mugabe was given all round support by Mengistu
during his liberation struggle and Mengistu was a conduit for the Soviet support to
Mugabe and therefore he is now returning the favor.
The Ethiopian authorities also requested the Italian Government to hand
over two former top Derg-WPE officials, holed up at the Italian Embassy in Addis
Ababa, indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity. The Italian Government
has not complied to date because the accused may be sentenced to death if found
guilty of the charges, which is contrary to the Italian laws.
There is no indication that the Ethiopian authorities have requested Ato
Issayas Afeworki, the Eritrean President, to turn over his military advisor, a former
top Derg-WPE official indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity by the
SPO. If the various governments are unwilling to turn over the indicted individuals
to the Ethiopian Courts, then under the Genocide Convention they have the
obligation to prosecute them in their own courts.
180. Diane Orentlicher, Symposium: Transition to Democracy and Rule of Law, 5
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1054 (1990).
181. See Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-17-T;,. see also An
International Fugitive Goes Free, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1998, at 56.
182. The designation of the same Prosecutor for the two Tribunal. has been the
Achilles' heel of the Tribunal. The Prosecutor sits in the Hague with occasional one
or two day sojourns to Kigali and Arusha, with no time to interact with the staff, the
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and appointed by the U.N. Security Council.' The Statute requires
that the prosecutor have the highest level of professional competence
and vast experience in the investigation and prosecution of crimes."'
Government or the NGOs.
183. See Article 16 of the ICTYStatute.
184. In the author's opinion, the appointment of the Prosecutor is hea~ily
influenced by the weight of the country of citizenship of the Prosecutor carries at the
U.N. The statutory requirements that prosecutors be persons well experienced in
investigation and prosecution was completely disregarded when the Security Council
appointed a Canadian, Judge Louise Arbour, who had no experience in either
criminal investigation or prosecution. On the other hand, the Secretary General Mr.
Kofi Annan, following intense media campaign largely orchestrated by Judge
Arbour, dismissed from the position of Deputy Prosecutor, a brilliant Malagache
Judge with thirty years of prosecutorial and judicial experience without any hearing.
The Rwandan Genocide Survivors Association (IBUKA) also held tw o public
demonstrations at the premises of the Tribunal in Kigali , which the author witnessed
himself, demanding Judge Arbour's removal for alleged incompetence and racism.
The Judges of the Tribunal including the President went public on a number of
occasions demanding the separation of the Tribunals and designating a prosecutor for
the ICTR who would live in Kigali. Lastly when the Rwandese authorities also
demanded in a letter to the Secretary General the removal of Judge Arbour, the
Canadian Government came to her rescue and threatened the Rwandese authorities
that Canada will discontinue some aid ear marked for upgrading the R%%andan justice
system. The intervention of the Canadian Government on behalf of the Prosecutor
does not speak well for the independence of the Prosecutor. In addition the mere
fact that the Prosecutor has been accused of racism against Africans by the Tribunal
staff and the Rvandese genocide survivors in a letter written to the Secretary
General seriously besmirches the image of the Tribunal which heretofore had been
without blemish along these lines. See letter written to the Secretary General by the
Rwandan Government (on file with the Rwandan U.N. Mission in New York). See
also a letter written to the Secretary General by IBUKA, - Appeal to the Secretary
General the U.N," February 18, 1997 (on file with IBUKA Office, c/o Dr. Kayjaho,
Josue, B.P. 1787 Kigali, Rwanda.).
In an interview discussing a seminar given to the ICTR staff by Canadian
trainers, Judge Arbour lauded the seminar as a success and added that the trials "are
Canada's assertion of a credible presence in establishing and enforcing an
international justice system that may rival its peace making reputation". In the same
interview. Judge Arbour asserted, "There is a high demand for Canadians for
Rwandan tribunal, because, historically Rwanda's second language was French. But
it is not possible to recruit from Belgium or France, who were among Africa's
traditional colonial powers. That leaves Canada and Switzerland as very desirable
sources of French speaking and bilingual staff." Complete disregard of half of Africa
who speak French is either a reflection of ignorance of Africa or something more
sinister. Besides there are many interpreters and translators at the Tribunal vho
provide prompt and highly efficient service and language has never been a problem.
See Julius Melnitzer, Louise Arbour: Canadians on Demand on War Crimes Tribunal
INTERNATIoNAL LAW: LAW TIMES 10 (Feb. 17-23, 1997). The requirement of the
"moral high character and.., highest level of competence and experience" stipulated
in the ICTY Statute, unlike the other characteristics, strangely enough are not
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His office is required to act as an independent organ of the Tribunal
and should not seek or receive instructions from any other source,
including government sources. '
The appointment of the prosecutor is not a benign exercise; it is
fraught with competition and intrigue between States with different
agendas for the ICTR prosecutor. According to Virginia Morris and
Michael Scharf, "[tihe selection of the Prosecutor became one of the
more bizarre tales associated with the establishment of the
Tribunal."' The tug-of-war between different members of the U.N.
Security Council to appoint a candidate of their choice went on for
five months. No less than five candidates were turned down for
reasons mainly having to do with their nationality or religion.'
Finally, Justice Richard Goldstone, a renown South African jurist and
prosecutor for the ICTY, was appointed.)'
The Statute of the ICTR specifies the precise powers and
responsibilities of the prosecutor." The prosecutor is charged with
investigating and prosecuting persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of Rwanda and against Rwandan citizens in neighboring
States in 1994."0 Based on the ICTR's primacy jurisdiction, the
prosecutor may request deferral of any investigation or criminal
proceeding instituted in the courts of any State. 9' Furthermore,
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence permit the prosecutor to
request information about suspects from other Stales.'" The
Prosecutor may also request the transfer and provisional detention of
a suspect to the U.N. holding facilities in Arusha. In cases of
emergency, the Prosecutor may request that a State arrest and hold a
repeated in the ICTR Statute Article 15. The Tribunal is not free from favoritism to
one's compatriots, which has also been seen in the other sections of the Tribunal.
185. See ICTY Statute, Article 16.
186. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, 1 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, VOL. 161 (1994).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 161-62.
189. See ICTR Statute, Arts. 15 & 17.
190. ICTR Statute, Article 15; Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
See also ICTR Statute, Article 17.
191. Rules 8 & 9 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
192. Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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suspect until the suspect can be transferred to the U.N. detention
facilities. As a whole, the ICTR Prosecutor, backed by the power of
the U.N. Security Council, has adequate power to investigate, indict,
and prosecute any suspect, from anywhere in the world, who falls
within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
VI. Comparison of the Ethiopian and ICTR System
The procedures used to establish the ICTR are clearly superior
to the use of the Ethiopian court in terms of efficiency, justice, and
the appearance of justice. Whereas the U.N. Security Council
established the ICTR,'9" an unelected government that fought and
defeated the very persons it now prosecutes created the Ethiopian
system. Even though the SPO, as a governmental ministry, is clearly
answerable to the government, the resonance of victor's justice will
inevitably haunt the Ethiopian trials, especially if the defendants are
found guilty.95 Furthermore, the ICTR's legality was challenged and
found to be in accordance with the law. Such a judicial test, however,
is not available for the Ethiopian trials. The Ethiopian law does not
permit the legality of the establishment of the regular courts.
The ICTR has the distinct task of assigning specific duties to the
Prosecutor, establishing qualifications of the Prosecutor and judges,
delineating precise procedures the prosecutor should follow in
instituting a case, and ensuring the prosecutor's independence in
carrying prosecutorial functions. In the Ethiopian system, the judges
and Prosecutor are nominated and appointed by various
governmental organs. Both the judges and Prosecutor are required to
adhere to a certain political philosophy enshrined in the transitional
charter," which embodies the ideology of the EPRDF.r"
193. Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
194. The argument whether the Security Council represents the interests of its
member countries or humanity in general is a contentious issue that we do not
address here. See Secretary General of the American Association of Jurists Rvanda
Tribunal Critique, (October 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author
and 300 Lo Pariseau, suite 2201, Montreal, Quebec, Canada).
195. The comparison of the Ethiopian trials with the trials of Nazi officials at
Nuremberg is quite apt. Both being victor's justice, just as the Trials at Nuremberg,
the outcome of the Ethiopian trials will always be suspect. For discussion on the
issue of victor's justice. See Hans Keller, supra note 12.
196. See Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, No. 1, NEGARIT GAZETA, July
22,1991.
197. See id.
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The Ethiopian Prosecutor's powers and responsibilities are not
clearly defined by the Proclamation establishing the SPO. While the
Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code identifies the responsibilities of
the Prosecutor, neither the Code nor the Proclamation are as clear as
the ICTR Statutes and Rules of Procedure, which clearly identify the
functions of the ICTR. Furthermore, nowhere does the Proclamation
charge the Special Prosecutor to investigate or prosecute crimes of
genocide or crimes against humanity. Rather, the Prosecutor is




The Special Prosecutor filed charges of genocide, crimes against
humanity and other crimes against seventy-three Derg-WPE high
level officials at the Central High Court in Addis Ababa. Those
indicted include Mengistu Haile Mariam, former iPresident of
Ethiopia, and twenty-two others charged in absentia.19 The accused
are being held for the murder of 1,823 persons, causing grave bodily
injury to ninety-nine persons and the disappearance of 194
individuals. According to the indictments, victims include the late
Emperor Haile Selassie and sixty high government officials and
Cabinet Ministers, His Holiness Abuna Tewoflos, Patriarch of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Sheik Said Budella Budella, Head of
the Guragaie Muslims, Kes (Reverend) Gudina Tumsa, President of
the Ethiopian Lutheran Church, journalists, labor union leaders,
renowned intellectuals and thousands of students.1" The first trial of
the top leaders began on December 13, 1994 with the presiding judge
reading the indictments over a four day period.2"
After considering whether to apply international humanitarian
law or the articles of the Ethiopian Penal Code, the Ethiopian
authorities decided that the prosecution will be based n ainly on the
Ethiopian Penal Code, with the reservation that, if the Ethiopian
Penal Code does not cover a particular act, then international
198. AADLAND & ROGLIEN, supra note 104 (appearance notice and order was
published in the newspaper on December 13,1994).
199. Addis Zemen, December 14, 1994, at 1-2.
200. AADLAND & ROGNLIEN, supra notel04.
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humanitarian law as embodied in the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
the Hague Convention IV, the Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, and the Charter of
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) would apply:
The indictments, however, make no reference to international
humanitarian law and are exclusively based on the Ethiopian Penal
Code.
The original Ethiopian indictments written in Amharic are more
than two hundred pages long and allege 211 criminal counts.
According to the indictment, persons who allegedly committed
"offenses" cited in the Proclamation are charged with violations of
articles 281 and 286 of the Ethiopian Penal Code, which provides for
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and incitement to
genocide and crimes against humanity.:" In the alternative, the
defendants are charged with aggravated homicide under Article 522
of the Ethiopian Penal Code, grave willful injury under Article 538,
abuse of power under Article 414 and unlawful arrest or detention
201. See Tore Engeiscion, supra note 178, at 48-49.
202. Article 281.-Genocide; Crimes Against Humanity.
Whosoever, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic.
racial, religious or political group, organizes. orders or engages in, b. it in
time of war or in time of peace:
(a) killings, bodily harm or serious injury to physical and
mental health of members of the group, in any way
whatsoever; or
(b) measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival
of its members or their progeny; or
(c) the compulsory movement or dispersion of peoples or
children, or their placing under living conditions calculated to
result in their death or disappearance is punishable with
rigorous imprisonment from five years to life, or, in cases of
exceptional gravity, with death.
Article 286.Provocation and preparation.
Whosoever, with the object of committing, permitting or supporting any of
the acts provided for in the preceding articles:
(a) publicly encourages them, by word of mouth, images or vriting'. or
(b) conspires towards or plans with another. urges the formation 4ff, or
himself forms a band or group, joins such a band or group, adhere's to iv,
schemes or obeys its instructions, is punishable with rigorous
imprisonment not exceeding five years.
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under Article 416.
The Ethiopian Prosecutor was not required to obtain court
approval before issuing the indictments. He only had to determine
that there was sufficient ground to believe that the detainee
committed the crime and file the indictment with the court.2"
According to Ethiopian law, preliminary inquiry by a judge is
mandated only for homicide in the first degree and aggravated
robbery unless the High Court dispenses with the requicement. " As
the statute currently reads, charges for genocide and crimes against
humanity do not entitle a suspect to a preliminary inquiry to
determine probable cause. The absence of genocide and crimes
against humanity from the Criminal Procedure Code must have been
an oversight on the part of the drafters because these are the most
heinous crimes a person may be accused of and should unot be treated
less seriously than first degree murder or aggravated robbery. Thus, a
person accused of genocide or crimes against humanity may have to
go through an agonizing trial only to find out at the conclusion of the
Prosecutor's case in chief that there was no reasonable ground for his
indictment. Acquittal of an accused at this stage is not a good
substitute for preliminary inquiry or review of the indictrent. 5
The indictments accuse the defendants of establishing themselves
as a provisional military council or government and setting up
committees and sub-committees for the purpose of committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against various political groups
whom the accused referred to as "anti-people" and "counter-
revolutionary" in violation of Articles 32 and 281 of the Penal Code
of Ethiopia. Further, the indictments allege that the defendants
incited and encouraged people to massacre thousands of members of
different political groups in violation of Articles 32(1)(a) and 286(a)
of the Penal Code.
The fundamental problem with these indictments is that the
details of the crimes are unclear because several concepts and legal
doctrines are lumped together in one very long sentence. 2 This is a
203. See Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, arts. 40 & 42.
204. See Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, art. 80.
205. See Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, art. 141.
206. The charges in the indictment written in long winded sentences are hard to
comprehend. They specify the place, date and manner in which the accused, as
governmental groups, incited people throughout the country to commit genocide
against members of other political groups in violation of the Penal Code. See, Special
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defect that goes to the form of the indictment set out in Articles 111
and 112 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code.:' The defense
attorneys should have raised this lack of clarity as a preliminary
objection. No lay accused, even with the assistance of a counsel,
could be expected to fully understand the details of the charges. The
accused's ability to fully comprehend the charges brought against him
is fundamental to a fair trial.:
The details of the indictments spell out various genocidal acts the
accused allegedly committed, including killings, causing bodily harm
or serious injury to the physical and mental health of persons, and
placing victims under conditions calculated to result in the death or
disappearance of members of a "section of multinational political
unit."": The problem with these charges is that it is not clear what is
meant by a "section of multinational political unit." Furthermore, the
charges do not spell out what specific criminal acts each of the
accused carried out.
One serious lacuna in the Ethiopian trials, unlike the Rwandan
trials, is the complete absence of any reference to sexual crimes,
which were widespread at the time.211 Sexual crimes cannot be
brought within the ambit of the genocide and crimes against humanity
provision as the terms are defined in the Ethiopian Penal Code. This
Prosecutor of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia v. Colonel Mengistu
Hailemariam, Ex-chairman of the Congress and standing-committee of the
Provisional Military Administrative Council or Government (PMAC) (in absentia),
eL al.
207. These articles of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code (Articles 111 and
112) spell out the content and form of the charges and descriptions of the
circumstances under which the crimes have been committed "so as to enable the
accused to know exactly what charge he has to answer."
208. Article 14(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
mandates that everyone charged with a criminal offense must be. informed
promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of
the charge against him." See, Office of Public Information, United Nations, The
International Bill of Human Rights: Universal Declaration of Hunman Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political rights and Optional Protocol (1978).
209. Liberally translated by the author. There is not official English translation.
The author has therefore translated the indictment for the purpose of discussing the
charges.
210. Sexual crimes, as one of the component crimes in crimes against humanity
provision of the ICTR, are not covered in the genocide provision. If the SPO had
charged under international humanitarian law as agreed earlier, he could have
brought the charge under one of the Geneva Conventions.
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is unlike the ICTR Statute, which includes rape as one of the
components of crimes against humanity.2 1' Rape cannot be charged
under the ICTR's genocide provision because of the problem in
establishing the necessary mens rea to destroy, in whole or part, a
group protected by the genocide provision.212
2. ICTR
When the ICTR investigation yields prima facie evidence that a
suspect may have committed a crime, the Prosecutor prepares an
indictment .2 " The indictment must clearly state the name and
particulars of the suspect and lay out, in a concise manner, a
statement of the facts and elements of the alleged crime."4
A typical ICTR indictment first ascertains the authority of the
prosecutor to bring the charges under the Statute."' This is followed
by a clear and precise citation of the international humanitarian law
allegedly violated. The indictment then explains the background
events surrounding the crime and provides a brief description of the
accused and the role the person played in committing the crime. The
general elements of the crime are spelled out as general allegations,
and the specific criminal acts the accused is charged with are
described. In addition, the criminal counts enumerate the number of
times international humanitarian law was violated by different
criminal acts.
A judge must approve an indictment before it can be issued. The
indictment and supporting documents (including witness statements
and affidavits) are forwarded to the registrar who assigns the
preliminary review to a judge, who cannot .later try the case."" The
prosecutor, without the presence of the accused, presents his case to
the reviewing judge. If the reviewing judge does not find prima facie
evidence that the accused may have committed the crime, the judge
211. See ICTR Statute, Article 3.
212. For elaborate discussion whether rape would constitute serious bodily or
mental harm, as understood in the genocide provision, see ICTY, Sexual Crimes
(1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
213. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Rule 47, July 1996.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., the indictment, Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-
96-4-T. (on file with the author).
216. See RULES OF PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE, Rule 47, July 1996.
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may dismiss the indictment without prejudice and a right to appeal.* "
However, if the prosecutor presents a prima facie case against the
accused, the judge will confirm the indictment." ' The accused has the
chance to oppose the charges only after the initial appearance:"' with
the right of interlocutory appeal on the Tribunal's jurisdiction.- '
The indictment review process of the ICTR and the clarity of its
indictments are clearly preferable to the Ethiopian process. The
ICTR indictment gives adequate notice of the charges and an
opportunity to quash the charges to the accused without having to go
through a trial. Moreover, the accused's opportunity to challenge the
Tribunal's jurisdiction at his initial appearance contributes to the
ICTR's efficiency. In the Ethiopian Court, jurisdiction is not
regarded as a preliminary matter that the accused can object to at the
initial appearance.n' Rather, it appears to be a matter to resolve at
trial, which may mean that the accused wqll have to go through a
lengthy trial process only to discover that the court did not have
jurisdiction to try the case in the first place.
The Ethiopian indictment is unclear and lacks significant
elements necessary for providing adequate notice to an accused,
including the exact elements of the crimes allegedly committed.
Except for accusing the defendants as being members of the
provisional military council or government, their individual roles in
the criminal enterprise are rarely particularized by the Ethiopian
indictments.' Clearly identifying the role and position of the
217. Bagosora's indictment was amended by the Prosecutor to join him with 2
other individuals pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
providing for the joinder of the accused. Judge T. Khan was seized of the case and
refused to confirm the newly amended indictment and the Prosecutor appealed
against the decision. The Appeals Chamber unanimously rejected the Prosecutor's
request for reversal of Judge Khan's findings and dismissed the Prosccutor\s
indictment against Bagosora and 28 others. This however, dous not extinguish the
indictment against Bagosora and others. The Prosecutor may amend and refile the
indictment for confirmation with leave of the judge who confirmed the original
indictment. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALTRIBUNAL. ICTR UPDATE, June t. 1 P.
218. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Rule 62, 1996.
219. RULEs OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Rule 72, 1996.
220. Id.
221. See Ethiopian CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF ETHioPIA, Art. 130 (1961).
222. Witnesses typically narrate what happened to them personally or to the
member of their families or friends. Rarely do they point out that the accused
actually did anything to them or heard the accused give order to kill or torture the
witness or others. See unpublished witness statements in Trial Update, Trial
Observation and Information Project: A Joint Project of InterAfrica Group and
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individual is extremely important in considering direct culpability and
command responsibility, and superior authority, issues that the
defendants, who are mostly military officers, undoubtedly will raise."'
Furthermore, the role and position of the accused are relevant for
aggravating the guilty defendants' punishment.
The Ethiopian indictments also fall short of the ICTR in
specifying the date and venue of the crimes. The indictments only
allege that the crimes were committed "in Addis Ababa and
throughout the country" on different dates from 1974 to 1990.24 Such
a broad and indeterminate date and place would, for example, make
an alibi defense almost impossible.
One serious element that may have a negative impact on the
Ethiopian trial is the fact that Ethiopian law does not require either
side to make pre-trial disclosure of evidence. Rule 66 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence requires the Prosecutor to disclose all his
evidence "as soon as practicable" after the initial appearance of the
accused,' and the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code requires that
the Prosecutor and accused give the Registrar a list of witnesses
only. 6 For defense attorneys, however, this is insufficient, because
they would like to receive not only the list of witnesses but a list of all
the evidence the Prosecutor intends to present at the preliminary
hearing.' As the prior knowledge of who the witnesses are takes
away the element of surprise, it is more in line with due process of
law.
The shortcomings of the Ethiopian indictments do not, in any
Ethiopian Human Rights and Peace Center, (1996) (some copies on file with the
author).
223. All the accused were military officers at first until some of thum were stripped
of their military rank by Mengistu Haile Madam.
224. See Special Prosecutor of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia v. Colonel
Mengistu Haile Madam -Ex Chairman of the Congress and standing committee of
the Provisional Military Administrative Council or Government, et al. (unpublished)
(October 1994).
225. There has not been a formal ruling on what "as soon as pra.zticable" entails.
However, at the status conference of Kanyabashi case at which the author was
present, it was agreed that it should not exceed more than two months after the initial
appearance of the accused.
226. See ETHIOPIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF 1961, At. 124 . After
receiving the witness lists, the Registrar issues summons for the witnesses to appear
on the day of the trial.
227. The rights given to the defense is much favorable more at the ICTR than the
Ethiopian Court. See Rules 66 & 67 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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manner, violate the fundamental fights of an accused as protected by
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights or any
other international human right instruments. The point here is that
the ICTR indictments are more comprehensive and give better notice
to the accused of the scope of their responsibilities for their criminal
acts. While better notice and information would help the accused
prepare a better defense, the deficiencies do not derail justice because
this information will be brought out during trial.
B. Approaches to the Law of Genocide and Crimes Against
Humanity by the ICTR and Ethiopian Court
Raphael Lempkin coined the word genocide from Greek genos,
meaning race or people, and Latin cide, meaning killing, in response
to British Prime Minster Winston Churchill's reference to Nazi
atrocities as "nameless crimes."'' - During the same period, the U.N.
General Assembly defined genocide in much the same way:
Genocide ... is the denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to life of individual
human beings. Such denial of the right of existence shocks the
conscience of mankind, results in the great losses to humanity in the
form of culture and other contributions represented by these
human groups, and is contrary to moral law and the spirit and aims
of the United Nations. Many instances of such crimes of genocide
have occurred when racial, religious, political and other groups
have been destroyed, entirely or in part.2,
Alan Destexhe's understanding of the term genocide is more
circumspect and in line with the definition of genocide in the
Genocide Convention.'3 Destexhe argues that genocide is not "an
elimination of individuals because they are political adversaries, or
because they hold to what are regarded as false beliefs or dangerous
theories," but a crime "directed against the person as a person,
against the very humanity of the individual victim.""1 Destexhe
228. Louis Rene Beres, JUSTICE AND REAL POLITIK: INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
PREVENT1ON OF GENOCIDE, Am. J. Jutis. 123 (1998).
229. The Crime of Genocide G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doe. A/64, at 175-76 (1946). In
the Genocide Convention, however, political groups are excluded from protection
under the genocide provision.
230. See Convention on the Prevention and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. GAOR, 3"' Sess. pL1, at 174, U.N. Doe. A1810 (194S).
231. ALAIN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4
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argued that the term genocide:
has progressively lost its initial meaning and is becoming
dangerously commonplace. In order to shock people and gain their
attention to contemporary situation of violence or injustice by
making comparisons with murder on the greatest scale known in
this century, 'genocide' has been used as synonymous with
massacre, oppression and repression, overlooking what lies behind
the image it evokes in the attempted annihilation of the entire
Jewish race.2
Nonetheless, there seems to be no disagreement regarding the
criminal severity of genocide. The United Nations General Assembly
described genocide as "an assault by barbarity against civilization. It
is an affront to entire world community. " '
The definition of genocide'M and the acts enumerated under
Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTR are almost verbatim
reproductions of Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention.'
The existence of particular intent (dolus specialis) to destroy a racial,
ethnic, national or religious group as such characterizes the crime of
genocide. Though mens rea is a requirement for an act to be
classified as a crime, with the exception of strict liability crimes, the
particular and fundamental elemente of dolus specialis distinguishes
genocide from the common crime of murder or widespread and
systematic attacks against the civilian population because of ethnic,
racial, national, or religious motivations.
No tribunal has ever formally ruled on what constitutes the
necessary dolus specialis except for a passing reference by the ICTY
Trial Chamber during a review of the Nikolic indictment. In a
preliminary opinion, the Chamber decided in that case that "special
intent may be deduced from sufficient evidence which in certain cases
may include actions or omissions of such degree of criminal
negligence or recklessness that the defendant must reasonably
(1994,1995).
232. Id. at 6.
233. The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946).
234. The ICTR Statute, Art. 2.
235. See S.C. Res 955, supra note 3.
236. The travaux preparatoire of the Genocide Draft Convention confirms that
while the Brazilian and Panamanian representatives agreed to the retention of the
special intent requirement, the Soviet representative wanted to delete it. The
General Assembly voted to retain the special intent requirement. See U.N GAOR
6th Comm., 3d Sess., pt.1, 69th mtg.
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assumed to have been aware of the consequences of his conduct." '
In any event, premeditation does not appear to be a requirement.2 '
The protected groups listed in, but not defined by, the genocide
provision of the Convention and the ICTR Statute are national,
ethnical, racial, and religious groups. Neither the Convention nor
the ICTR Statute considers the destruction of a political, cultural,
economic, or other group as genocide!' People with diverse
ideologies and beliefs have attempted several times to define these
terms24  Because their meanings shift over time and vdth changing
circumstances, pinpointing the parameters of these terms is difficult.
The tribunals either must define the terms themselves (a risky
undertaking), or use the definitions given by the perpetrators. In
other words, it may be sufficient to ascertain what the perpetrators
understood their victims to be, irrespective of the victims' actual
identities.
The exclusion of political groups generated a heated debate
among commentators. Despite the very elaborate and all-
encompassing definition of genocide by Lempkin, he later joined
those who opposed the inclusion of political groups as a protected
group in the Genocide Convention. He, and others, argued that
political groups "lacked permanence and specific characteristics of
the other groups referred to." Furthermore, Lempkin added the
pragmatic argument that "the Convention should not run the risk of
failure by introducing ideas on which the world is deeply divided."'
Homogeneity is neither a necessary nor inevitable characteristic
of political groups; rather, these groups display more mutable
characteristics that result from their members' collective will.
Inclusion of political groups as a group protected from genocide
237. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, IT-94-2-R61, 20, S 34 (1995).
238. See GAOR, 3PSess., 6"Comte. 7" 'meeting, at 90.
239. See ICTR Statute, Art. 2(2).
240. See Article 2 of the ICTR Statute.
241. For example, section 1093 of the U.S. Criminal Code is bold enough to define
these vague terms.
242. Ambiguities in the meanings of these terms were evident at the outset of the
discussion on the Convention when they were used differently by representatives. See
U.N. GAOR 6h Comm. 3d Sess.. 64" mtg., U.N. Doe. bfand 74" nmectings. The
reference is to ethnic, racial, national and religious groups w~hich are sp2cifically
protected by the Convention.
243. U.N. GAOR 6h Comm., 3d Sess., pt. 1, 69'" mtg., U.N. Doe. 74-, 75' , and
128e.
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would encumber legally established governments from combating
subversion and leave the door open for economic and cultural groups
to be protected by the genocide definition as well." The only State
who did not limit protection to those groups specified in the
Convention was Ethiopia.
The ICTR solved the lack of protection for political groups by
providing a separate provision in its Statute aimed at protecting them.
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, rape, and persecution committed as widespread and
systematic attacks against political groups may be prosecuted under
the rubric of crimes against humanity.45 A judge may sentence a
person convicted of crimes against humanity to life in prison, which is
also the ICTR's highest level of punishment for genocide. "' The
provision on crimes against humanity removes the stringent
requirement of dolus specialis to exterminate the group, in whole or
part. An act constitutes a crime against humanity, when it is
systematic, widespread and directed against the civilian population on
the basis of their ethnic, racial, national, or religious background. 7
However, prosecution for the destruction of racial, ethnical, national,
or religious groups is not precluded under the genocide provision, if
the destruction of the protected groups takes place under the guise of
political groups.2"s
The Ethiopian indictments charge the accused with both
genocide and crimes against humanity under article 281 of the
Criminal Code,249 which extends protection to ethnic, national,
244. Id.
245. See ICTR Statute, Art. 3.
246. ICTR Statute, Art. 23.
247. See ICTR Statute, Article 3.
248. See NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY
62 n.18 (1996).
249. Criminal Code of Ethiopia, Art. 281 (Genocide: Crimes Against Humanity).
The provision reads:
Whosoever, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnic,
racial, religious or political group, organizes, orders or engages )n, be it in
time of war or in time of peace: killings, bodily harm or serious injury to the
physical or mental health of members of the group, in any way whatsoever;
or measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival of its members
or their progeny; or the compulsory movement or dispersion of peoples or
children, or their placing under living conditions calculated to result in their
death or disappearance, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for five
years to life, or, in cases of exceptional gravity, with death.
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religious and political groups. Unlike the ICTR, under the Ethiopian
law, it will not be sufficient to prove that the attacks were widespread
and systematic against particular political groups, but the requisite
intent of dolus specialis also must be proven, making the Prosecutor's
job harder." If Ethiopian lav had a similar provision " to the
ICTR-a separate provision for crimes against humanity-the
Prosecutor could charge the defendants for the same acts and with
the same consequences without bringing the charges within the ambit
of the stringent genocide special intent test. 
"
The SPO will have a difficult time proving that the intent of the
defendants was to exterminate the members of these groups. It
appears that the general intention of the defendants was to subdue
and defeat the opposition, not necessarily destroy the group. In fact,
many members of these political groups were allowed to join the
ruling regime once they surrendered to the government by
renouncing their opposition.
To avoid the problematic intent issue associated with prosecuting
the defendants for genocide or crimes against humanity, the
Prosecutor could proceed against the defendants with homicide,
bodily injury, illegal detention, and other more common crimes under
the Ethiopian Criminal Code. In fact, the Prosecutor has done this by
listing these alternative charges in the indictments. Argentina
250. The charges identify the political groups by name; they were all either
political parties or ethnic-cum political parties. Neither the legislative intent of the
ICTR Statute, the Genocide Convention nor the Ethiopian Criminal Code define
"political groups." If Ethiopian judges interpret political groups to mean political
parties, then the Ethiopian Prosecutor will not be able to seek justice for all the
victims of the Derg atrocities since the indictment shows that not all %ictims were
members of political parties. Many of the victims were members of Emperor Haile
Selassie's government and had no political affiliation to any political party. There
was also no way of ascertaining whether the alleged members or supporters of the
Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party, bte noire of the Dergue-WPE, which
suffered the brunt of the atrocities were actually "members" of the party. because no
member ever carried membership identification.
251. The reference is to ICTR StatuteArt. 3.
252. The Ethiopian Prosecutor may have been tempted to charge the defendants
with genocide because the massacres and atrocities allegedly committed by the
defendants were in a scale heretofore unknown in the Ethiopian history. But "'special
intent" being subjective element of the crime of genocide distinguishes it from the
common crime of murder. In the absence of that particular intent to destroy the
group in whole or in part, whatever the degree of atrocity of an act and however
similar and close it might be to the acts described in the Genocide Convention, that
act would still not be called genocide.
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followed this method for prosecuting the military junta and other
human rights violators from its former regime. 3  However, these
charges make the trial less exotic and prone to less publicity and
would cause the loss of the international character of the crimes and
trials.
Some argue that the Ethiopian law is correct in combining crimes
against humanity and genocide into one provision; others believe that
they are two distinct crimes and should be kept separate." It is
apparent that the drafter of the Ethiopian Criminal Code, Jean
Graven, believed that genocide and crimes against humanity overlap,
not only because he combined the two into one provision, but
because he wrote, "[G]enocide is undoubtedly the most serious and
most typical of crimes against humanity. '
During the enactment process of the Genocide Convention, the
U.N. General Assembly felt that defining genocide as a crime against
humanity would create confusion.'b Stephen Glasser wrote that the
difference between genocide and crimes against humanity is one of
motive of the perpetrators of the crime. He pointed out that if the
aim of the perpetrators is to destroy the victims because of their
ethnic, racial, political or religious background, then their acts would
constitute a crime against humanity. If the acts were committed with
the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group, then the act would qualify as genocide.""
From the perspective of the Ethiopian trials, the inclusion of
political groups in the genocide provision could be perceived at as a
progressive act,' 8 which will advance the cause and protection of
253. See Luis Moreno Ocampo, The Nuremberg Parallel in Argentina, in Crime
and Punishment: Accountability for State Sponsored Mass Murder, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 328 (1990).
254. See DESTExIE, supra note 231, at 6; see also PRLINIER, supra note 64 at 239
note 45.
255. See Jean Graven, Les Crimes Contre Humanite, (Crimes agaiist Humanity,
RECUEIL DES COURS 478 (1950) (translation into English by the Secretariat).
256. See G.A. Res. 96, supra note 200.
257. See STEPHEN GLASSER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PitNAL CONVENTIONNEL
(CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW) 109 (1978).
258. During his response to the preliminary objections to the indictrrents raised by
several defense counsels, the Ethiopian Prosecutor argued, inter alia, that since the
inclusion of political groups would advance and expand the scope and parameters of
human rights, it should be interpreted broadly. Therefore, the inclusion of political
groups in the genocide provision must be considered as an expansion of human rights
law and thus progressive. In their preliminary objections, defense counsels argued
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human rights. On the other hand, it could be regarded as trivializing
the very serious nature of the crime of genocide,- which Payam
Akhavan calls the "ultimate crime":" by including more broadly
defined and fluid groups.:
From the perspective of the EPRDF, ample political diidend is
derived from accusing the detainees of genocide-an international
that the inclusion of political groups in the genocide provision when convention has
specifically excluded it as can be confirmed by the travaux preparatoire \ as a
violation of the Genocide Convention to which Ethiopia had acceded. The objection
was overruled.
Graven apparently surreptitiously slipped the term "political groups" into the
genocide provision when the Penal code of Ethiopia was drafted in 1957. There %%as
also very little body of jurisprudence on genocide and therefore the members of the
drafting Commission may not have been aware of the significance of including
"political groups" in Article 281. It would be stretching one's imagination to think
that autocrat Emperor Haile Selassie would have been overly concerned about the
protection of political groups who would seek his removal from the Throne.
The insertion of the political groups could not also be regarded as being specially
progressive in a Code which mandates death penalty in several of its provisions.
259. Destexhe complains that "the word genocide has fallen victim to verbal
inflation in much the same way as happened to the word fascist The term genocide
has progressively lost its initial meaning and is becoming dangerously commonplace.
In order to shock people and gain their attention to contemporary situations of
violence" people have used the term genocide to describe them. DESTEXHE, supra
note 197, at 6. In fact, Destexhe does not classify the Ethiopian masacres as
genocide, but lists the atrocities with other major tragedies since 1945 including those
of India (1947), Indonesia (1965-1966), Biafra (1968-1971), Bangladesh J1970-1971),
Vietnam (1965-1973), Cambodia (1975-1979), Somalia (1991-1992), Tibet (1951), and
Bosnia (1992) None of these events, according to Destexhe, qualify as genocides. L
at S.
One such misunderstanding of the meaning of "genocide" is the alleged
blockade of food to Eritrea by Mengistu's regime during the war between Mengistu
and the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front. Jean E. Zeiler asserts, "Mengistu's
policy of deliberate starvation [the people or the guerrillas?] constitutes genocide
under the United Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide." See Zeiler, supra note S.
Such a characterization overlooks the very particular intent of the perpetrator
to wipe out his victims as a nation or nationality in whole or in part. It overtasks
one's imagination to conclude that Mengistu intended to wipe out the Eritrean
nations or nationalities as such in whole or in part. He may have used food as a
weapon to win a war, but it is ludicrous to think that Mengistu intended to wipe out
the Eritrean peoples, as the definition of genocide requires. See FRANCOIS JE, XN, Du
BON USAGE DE LA FAMINE (THE POLrrIcs OF HUNGER) (1986).
260. Akavan, supra note 9, at 5.
261. Since massacres, tortures and disappearances were widespread with
unprecedented cruelty, the SPO and Ethiopian public, as other people else%% here may
have termed these crimes as genocide to express their horrors, over looking what lies
behind the image it evokes.
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crime. No Ethiopian event in recent memory, except perhaps the
1984-1985 famine, received so much media coverage. The media
praised the EPRDF government for sponsoring the biggest genocide
trial since Nuremberg and portrayed the trial as a harbinger of the
great things to come for Ethiopia under the leadership of the
EPRDF.2Z However, while Ethiopia gets international attention for
charging the defendants with genocide, the difficult standards of
proof embodied in Ethiopian law may make justice less forthcoming.
The Ethiopian law of genocide does not conform to the
internationally established standard and meaning of the term
"genocide," which as the ICTR Statute, clearly excludes political
groups from the protection of the genocide provision.263 Justice would
be better and easier served if Ethiopian law assigned separate
protection for political groups, like the Genocide Convention and
ICTR Statute. 6 Then, the defendants could be prosecuted without
proof of dolus specialis.
1. Prosecutorial Resources and Assignment of Counsel at the
Ethiopian Court
Trying to compare the resources at the disposal of the ICTR and
the Ethiopian courts for carrying out their respective tasks may be
like trying to compare the weight of an elephant with that of a mouse,
the scale tipping heavily in favor of the ICTR.
The Ethiopian SPO, as stated earlier, is charged with, inter alia,
conducting investigations on thousands of persons suspected of
committing gross violations of human rights during Derg rule.2"
After completing an initial investigation, the Prosecutor", must
decide whether to proceed with prosecution, order further
investigation, or declare nolle prosequi.67 About 250,000 Derg-WPE
documents, with some probatory value, have been compiled and
262. The transitional Government of Ethiopia adopted a Transitional Charter
which was to serve as an interim constitution until elections were held. Article I of
the Charter incorporates the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights as an
integral part of the Charter. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3"' Sess., pt.1 at 71, U.N.
Doc. /A/810 (1948).
263. See ICTR Statute, art. 2.
264. Id. at art. 3.
265. See Proclamation 22/1992, supra note 88. Crimes are normally investigated by
the police. See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 22 (Eth.).
266. See id. at art. 37.
267. See CRIMINAL CODE art. 38 (Eth.).
[Vol. 22:667
1999] The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The ICTR and Ethiopian High Court 723
entered into the SPO database.:" In addition, hundreds of wvitness
statements must be taken down and confirmed.: '  The SPO,
therefore, has a daunting and challenging task that will require a large
amount of resources in material and personnel.
The SPO is expected to accomplish its mandate with an annual
budget of a measly two million birr (US$318,000) allocated by the
national government.7r At its inception, the SPO hired thirty law;yers
and four hundred investigators who were slowed down by their
limited resources. Incensed by the continued arbitrary arrest of
persons suspected of committing human rights violations and the long
delay in bringing those already arrested to trial, Sweden, US/Carter
Center, Norway, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France all
pledged support in money, material, and experts."' While some
donors continue to support the SPO, others discontinued support
alleging that the trial process did not comply with international
standards.' At this moment, foreign support has either petered out
and is so insignificant that it does not impact the process in any
significant way.
The prosecutorial team consists of the Chief of the SPO and two
assistants, who are all trained in law with several years of experience
as judges, prosecutors, and judicial clerks. Thirty-six attorneys have
been assigned by the Court to defend the accused,- and a few others
are retained privately by their clients. Six of the accused dismissed
their court-appointed lawyers and are defending themselves!" There
268. AADLAND & ROGLIEN, supra note 104.
269. Id
270. This was the budget allocated to the SPO in 1996. Id.
271. See Todd Howland, Improving Himan Rights by Harmonizing International
Interventions: The Lessons to be Learned from the Carter Center's Intervention with
the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, A
NEW ROLE FOR THE UN HIGH COM1lMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (19"3)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author). Mr. Howland was formerly an
advisor of the Ethiopian Special Prosecutor.
272. Id.
273. The majority of them have advanced law degrees from Addis Ababa
University Law School, Furthermore, some of the attorneys supplemented their
training in U.S. and European law schools. Few also took short term courses leading
to a diploma at the Addis Ababa University Law School.
274. It is hard to imagine that the ICTR judges would allow any of the accused to
refuse the assistance of counsel and to defend themselves. After his initial
appearance, Akayesu dismissed his first lawyer, Johan Scheers, a Belgian attorney
assigned to him by the Registrar upon his own request. Pending the decision on
whether he should be given another attorney, Akayesu was allowed to cross examine
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are not enough attorneys for all the accused, forcing some attorneys
to defend two clients. The court-appointed lawyers are paid a total of
five thousand birr ($750) to defend an accused. The trial has already
taken three years and is yet to be completed."7 5 Defense attorneys are
not reimbursed for expenses they incur in connection with the
preparation of their cases. The resources available to the defense
attorneys are even worse than the resources available to the
prosecutor; thus, the balance of "equality of arms" tips in favor of the
prosecutor.26
2. Prosecutorial Resources and Assignment of Counsel at the
ICTR
The situation of the ICTR is very different. By standards
prevailing in Africa, the ICTR is choking in resources, despite the
unjustifiable, incessant complaint by the international press and
detractors of the Tribunal that it does not have the necessary
resources to undertake its mandate.' The United Nations allocated
an annual budget of US$58.9 million, of which US$17.7 million was
dedicated to the Office of the Prosecutor.' This budget is
supplemented by grants of money, material, equipment, experts and
other personnel donated by several countries, most notably the
Netherlands. 9
three prosecution witnesses. The Tribunal then assigned Michael Karnavas, a U.S.
Attorney who had initially assisted Scheus in Akayesu's defense. Akayesu later
dismissed Karnavas alleging that Karnavas blackmailed him into appointing him as
his defense counsel. Akayesu alleged that Karnavas threatened him, saying that
Akayesu would be executed if he was not represented by Karnavas. Karnavas was
replaced by two Cameroonian lawyers, who remained counsel of record through the
conclusion of the case.
275. See AADLAND & ROGNLIEN, supra note 104.
276. This raises a difficult question of whether a government is precluded from
putting on trial suspects of the most egregious crimes if it has no means to provide
what once in a staff meeting in Kigali Mrs. Arbour called "deluxe justice" which she
said the accused in Arusha should get. What are poor countries like Ethiopia to do,
if they simply have no means to provide judicial and prosecutorial resources at a level
consistent with the international standards, which in reality is the standard set for and
by wealthy countries of Western Europe and the United States?
277. See Elizabeth Neuffer, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 1996 at Al.
278. Press Conference on February 24, 1998 given in Arusha by Mi. Agwu Ukiwe
Okali, the Registrar of the Tribunal.
279. In 1996 and 1997, Dutch legal advisors and investigators in Kigali constituted
approximately 50 percent of the ICTR's investigative staff. Currently, the evidence
gathered by the Dutch forms the bulk of the evidence against most of the accused.
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In principle, three senior trial attorneys with extensive training in
law and vast experience in the legal profession as prosecutors,
practicing attorneys, and law professors are responsible for each
case. ' The senior trial attorneys are assisted by an assistant trial
attorney, legal advisers, investigators, interpreters, and case
managers.' I The senior trial attorneys and their assistants may also
tap on the "expertise" available from the ICTY the Hague.: " In fact,
the earlier indictments, motions, replies, and legal advice on some
legal issues were prepared largely at the Hague by ICTY staff and
legal advisors who work for the ICTR, but are stationed at the Hague.
At the ICTR, each accused is assigned a lead counsel and co-
counsel' of his choice from among those registered with the
Registrar, usually one from the civil law background and another
Whatever success the ICTR has in gathering evidence is largely made possible by the
dedication of the Dutch investigators.
280. Though neither the Rules of Procedure and Evidence nor the ICTR Statute
say anything about the qualifications of the Trial Attorneys, Rule 44 which stipulates
the qualifications of defense counsels has generally been accepted as applying to the
qualifications of Trial Attorneys. See Rule 44 of the Rules of Proedure and
Evidence. Judge Richard Goldstone resigned and was replaced by Judge Louise
Arbour, the number of Africans prosecuting cases decreased: they were replaced by
young and inexperienced Canadian and U.S. prosecutors. In fact, some of these new
prosecutors have no prior court experience in their respective countries. For
example, one of the prosecutors in Clement Kayeshema case, Prosecutor V. Clement
Kasyeshema ICrR-96-15-T, had not prosecuted any body before in or out of ICTR.
281. The Prosecutor could then have charged the defendants for the same acts and
with the same consequences as if they were charged with genocide, without bringing
the charges within the ambit of the stringent genocide test and yet achieve the same
results in establishing guilt and meting out by judges the same punishment as for
genocide.
282. Initially most of the indictments were prepared in the Hague. Akayesu.
Rutaganda and Kayeshema cases and others were prepared in the Hague and were
reviewed in the presence of the Prosecutors from Kigali.
283. In principle, a suspect or accused is entitled to an attorney w ho is assigned bi
the Registrar. In almost all cases, the Registrar is flexible and assigns two attorneys.
See Art. 15 of the Amendments to the Directives on the Assignnzcnt of Dfense
Counsel, as adopted on June 6, 1997.
284. See Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Occasionally, a
defendant insists on getting high profile lawyers to defend them. Dr. Gerard
Ntakirutimana, who is at the detention facility of the ICTR refuses to plead unless he
is represented by Mr. Ramsey Clark, a former U.S. Attorney General. Mr. Ramsey
Clark is defending the Seventh Day Adventist Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.
Gerard's father. The Pastor has lived in the United States since the genocide
occurred. The Texas circuit court quashed the ICTR Prosecutor's request for
extradition to Arusha where Pastor Ntakirutimana faces charges of genocide and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law s. See Nez; York Times,
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steeped in the common law system. An attorney who defends an
accused at the ICTR must be admitted to practice law in any State or
be a university professor of law.2s
The defense attorneys are paid very well,' 6 earning something
equal to or better than the going rate in Europe or the United
States.' They are reimbursed expenses incurred in connection with
preparing the defense. Most of the defense attorneys are highly
trained lawyers with vast legal experience in their respective countries
and satisfy the requirements laid down by the Rules of Procedures
and Evidence. The ICTR plenary recently raised the required
minimum years of experience to ten for an attorney to qualify for
pleading at the ICTR.' The resources marshaled by the Prosecutor
are comparable with those available to the defense; thus, both parties
enjoy relative equality of arms."
The ICTR courtrooms are well equipped with microphones,
video and audio equipment, ample space for the audience, and
simultaneous translation facilities. These courtrooms aie better than
any others in Africa. Furthermore, there is a witness protection unit
that caters to the well being and safety of the witnesses before,
during, and after they testify in Arusha. A beechcraft is exclusively
dedicated to the service of the Tribunal and shuttles witnesses back
and forth and provides transport to the staff whenever necessary.
With all of the above resources, the Tribunal is adequately equipped
supra note 87. The decision of the Circuit Court of Texas directly contravenes
several provisions of the ICTR Statute, including Articles 8 and 28 and Articles VI of
the Genocide Convention, which have been incorporated into U.S. law.
285. See Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
286. See art. 22, Directives on Assignment of Defense Counsel, document Prepared
by Registrar and approved by the Tribunal on January 9, 1996.
287. By one estimate on file with the author, by the time a full trial concludes
(which so far has taken more than two years), a defense attorney may net from
US$400,000 to US$500,000. The first case Akayesu's case has been dragging for
more than two years. Akayesu was first arrested in Zambia on October 10, 1995 and
was transferred to the detention facilities of the Tribunal in Arusha on May 26, 1996,
At his initial appearance he pleaded not guilty to the charges on May 30, 1996. His
case has now been adjourned for the end of August 1998 for decision. As should be
expected, he will appeal if he is found guilty. His case would have taken exactly two
years and three months since his initial appearance in the Tribunal, without including
the time necessary to decide the appeal. See ICTR News Number 2, September 2,
1997.
288. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Plenary Session Adopts
Measures to Speed Up Cases, Press and Pubic Affairs Unit, June 8, 1988.
289. Id.
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to fulfill its limited and specific mandate of prosecuting those persons
suspected of committing violations of international humanitarian
law." The Tribunal's activities have never been halted or canceled
for lack of essential resources.
3. Independence and Qualifications of the Ethiopian Bench
The issue of judicial independence from any kind of influence,
either fear or inducement to subvert the law, is arguably the most
important pivotal condition for a fair trial. The Ethiopian
Constitution of 1996 guarantees judges, in their judicial functions,
freedom from interference or influence by the government, its
subsidiaries, or any other source.- ' Judges may not be removed
except for specific reasons such as reaching retirement age, illness,
gross incompetence, or inefficiency, as determined by the Judicial
Administration Commission.:' According to the constitution, they
are also financially independent of the Executive.:' However, these
goals and objectives the judiciary aspires to achieve are quite
different from today's reality. 2
Today and historically judicial independence has not been a
hallmark of the Ethiopian judicial system. Judges in Ethiopia:
suffer from self-imposed restraints in cases which touch upon
Government interest. The duty to protect the State is deeply
embedded in the judiciary. The reason for this fear, it was said, is
lack of a history of independence. It is said that many judges still
do not believe that they really have been given independence xis-a-
290. While the ICTY may have the luxury of engaging in the development of
international human rights law that will raise the standards to a new height, the ICTR
has the urgent task of helping end impunity in Rwanda and bring about reconciliation
among the Rwandese people; time is of the essence. Whatever ICTR can contribute
to in the development and enhancement of international human rights law, it will
come about as a by-product of the trial process. The accusation by the Rwandese
that the ICTR is just a dry run for the establishment of the forthcoming pnrmanent
international tribunal is persistent. See letter written by IBUKA ( Do not forget)-
genocide survivors association to the Secretary General of the United Nations
following a demonstration against the Prosecutor Mrs. Arbour (on file with IBUKA).
291. See Article 79 of the Constitution.
292. For the list of the members of the Commission and their responsibilities, see
Articles 8 and 9, Proclamation No. 231/1992, Negarit Gazetta, 51" Year, NO. 19, 1992.
293. See Art. 79 (6) of the 1996 Ethiopian Constitution.
294. For actual cases of interferences by regional governments, see Siegfried
Pausewang, Ethiopia, in HuNLAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES YE.RBOOW
(Baer et al. eds. ) 225-26 (1996)
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vis the Government. Accordingly, this self-restraint prevails even
without any direct pressure.2
The wholesale dismissal of judges ostensibly to reconstruct the
judiciary in accordance with the new reality brought about by the
constitution did not augur well for instilling a sense of the
independence on the judiciary. 96
The presiding judge, who is also President of the Central High
Court and a former member of the Supreme Court, has more than
thirty years experience as a prosecutor and judge at various levels of
the Ethiopian court system. He graduated from Addis Ababa
University Law School' and recently visited the United States where
he was briefed about the U.S. judicial system. 9" The second judge has
a similar level of legal training but less judicial experience." The
third judge, who is also the youngest, also graduated from Addis
Ababa University Law School with a LL.B. degree. He has five years
of experience on the bench at the High Court level.2' The last two
judges were detained by the Derg-WPE regime, whose leaders they
are now trying.
The presiding judge generally has given a well-balanced and
professional impression by way of leading the court meetings.""
There is no evidence of partiality in the courtroom, and he is
conducting the hearings in a polite and calm manner. Furthermore,
the court's procedural rulings seem to be well reasoned and in
accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code." While defense
attorneys expressed some frustrations over the rejection of their
various motions and the overall negative disposition of the presiding
judge towards them, nobody has questioned the underlying fairness of
295. Frode Elgesem, The Derg Trials in Context: A Study of Some Aspects on the
Ethiopian Judiciary, 1 HuM. RTS REPORT 16 (1998).
296. Id.
297. See Aadland & Rognlien, supra note 104.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1Z
301. In my personal observation, proper decorum, civility, and professionalism
prevailed on all sides, including the judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and
accused. But see TECOLA WORQ HAGOs, DEMOCRATIZATION? ETHIOPIA (1991-1994:
A PERSONAL VIEW (1995) (stating that the court is nothing but a sham whose
purpose is to exact revenge against the former enemies of the TPLF and not to
render justice to the accused).
302. See Aadland & Rognlien, supra note 104.
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the trial as a whole.'
4. The Judges of the ICTR
Article 12 of the ICTR Statute mandates that the judges "shall
be persons of high moral character, impartiality, and integrity."
While there is no explicit reference to their being independent, such
an attribute can be interpreted into the what the Statute refers to as
"impartiality and integrity."'  While the judges may be overly
sensitive to the international press and pressure by human rights
groups, there was absolutely no occasion where the author observed
they compromised their judicial independence.' -'
The presiding judge and President of the Tribunal, Laity Kama,
is from Senegal. President Kama held a variety of prosecutorial
positions at provincial levels until he became Assistant Public
Prosecutor at the Court of Appeals and the Assize Court of Dakar,
where he served for fifteen years..*' In 1992, he was appointed First
Assistant Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Senegal* Kama participated in the drafting of several human rights
instruments and, as the result, gained vast experience in human rights
law./ As is the case with the civil law system judges, ' to whom Judge
Kama belongs, he played an extremely active role in questioning
prosecution, defense, and expert witnesses."
The second judge, Lennart Aspegren, is a Swedish judge who
brings an array of judicial experience to the ICTR. He served at
various levels as a civil and criminal law judge in the Swedish legal
system, including Judge of Stockholm Court of Appeals." Later, he
303. See Frode Elgesem, supra note 295.
304. The independence of the Tribunal has been challenged by defene counsel in
the Kanyabashi Case No. ICTR-96-15-T on the basis that it was established by the
Security Council as a subsidiary. The defense counsel argued that ICTR being an
appendage to an international organ which has coercive and policing power could not
be independent. The Chamber quashed the motion dismissing the objection. See
decision on jurisdiction in the case between Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Cas,.
ICIR-96-15-T.(June 18, 1997).
305. See ICTR Statute art. 12(1).
306. See ICTR NEws, June 1, 1997, at 3.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL Lxvw S',-sTEM: A,.
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (2- ed.) (1977).
310. See ICTR NEws, supra note 306.
311. Id. at 4.
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was appointed the Under Secretary for Legal Affairs at the Ministry
for Public Administration in 1979, and then served as a judge of the
Swedish Supreme Court for Social Welfare."2 Judge Aspegren was
the chairman of various governmental commissions of inquiries and
took part in several international negotiations and conferences, in
addition to providing consultant services to various governments.'"
Judge Aspegren has been very active in posing some very perceptive
questions both to the prosecutor and the witnesses.14
The third judge, Navanethem Pillay, is from South Africa where
he was a member of the bench and bar. Initially, Judge Pillay was a
private practice attorney when he was appointed to the position of
Acting Judge of the Supreme Court in South Africa."' Judge Pillay
held leadership positions in several human right organizations
including trustee of the Lawyers for Human Rights and chair of
Equality Now-an international human rights organization for action
on women's rights.1 Judge Pillay, the only female judge at the ICTR,
has been active in asking questions, especially during those
testimonies involving sexual crimes against women. 17
5. Detention Facilities and the Treatment of Detainees While in
Custody in Ethiopia
Ethiopian detainees are held in comparatively harsh conditions
at a huge compound known as Alem Bekagn-literally meaning "I
have had enough of the world" or "good-bye to the world." Visits by
relatives and friends are allowed once a week under the supervision
of prison guards. 8 Prison doctors give medical attention in serious
cases, while patients are transferred to local hospitals in very severe
cases.319  The prison rooms are very crowded, and the sanitary
312. Id.
313. See Akavan, supra note 9, at 4.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 5.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. The author practiced law in Ethiopia from 1971-1977 and had occasions to
visit clients in Alem Bekagn then and more recently. Though the prison condition
may be harsh, as all prisons are to a degree, it could not be characterized as being
particularly inhuman. In fact many prisoners prefer to go to Alem Bekagn, rather
than being incarcerated in police stations or other prisons.
319. Id.
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condition is abhorrent.:3 Detainees are allowed to go out from their
rooms once a day for several hours. Except for disciplinary reasons,
detainees are allowed to communicate vith each other, read books,
and listen to the radio. Detainees have complained on several
occasions that they were subjected to solitary confinement and other
punishments for their active participation in their own defense before
the court.
Evaluating the overall condition of the detention facilities in
Ethiopia, Red Cross representative Mr. Dominique Gross said:
We do not expose the Government publicly to pressure it to change
the condition of the prisoners are held under. If we do that the
Government may deny us its cooperation. The prisoners will not
benefit from it either. Up to now we have not confronted any
situation regarding prison conditions, which we believe should be
communicated to the people. Conditions seem to be encouraging.
If there are minor problems, we believe that the Government w ill
solve them. The situation is encouraging when compared with
prison conditions in other African countries.2'
This is a diplomatically couched statement that really says the holding
conditions in the Ethiopian prison are bad. The situation in the U.N.
detention facilities in Arusha sharply contrasts with those in Ethiopia.
6. U.N. Detention Facilities in Arusha
The U.N. holding facilities are built adjacent to a Tanzanian
prison. Each detainee is assigned one room with a bed in one comer
and a Turkish toilet over which a showerhead hangs, on the other
end.-" Near the door a table is stacked with towels, soap, tooth brush,
and toothpaste. Doctors are on call twenty-four hours a day and
routine medical checkups are given monthly. - According to Judge
320. Id.
321. Bruktait Haile, Special Report: Let us Litigate, SALEI, Special Edition Vol. 1,
No. 12, 6 (Guenbot 12, 1985-Ethiopian Calendar) (June 28, 1992) (Translation from
the Amharic by the author).
322. The author was able to get information about the U.N. detention facilities in
Arusha during his visit to the detention facilities in December 1996. (Notes on file
with author).
323. See Provisional Rules Covering the Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or
Appeal Before or Otherw'ise Detained on the Authority of the Tribunal, 1996,
Amendment, prepared by the Registrar, 1997, spells out the rights and priileges of
the detainees. This information was given to the author when he visited the facilities
on December 1996.
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Aspegren, though dismissed by the Registrar as untrue, the detainees
are allowed to see each other and use computers and telephones. The
Registrar's office stated that the telephone calls are restricted to
family members and lawyers. 4 It is a case of twisted justice that the
detainees in Rwanda who may have committed these unspeakable
crimes at the behest of those detained in Arusha survive in subhuman
conditions in crowded cells, while those who planned and executed
the crimes wallow in relative comfort.
The ICTR detention facility is by far superior to its Ethiopian
counterpart. While without doubt the detainees at the U.N.
detention facility are "treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person, ' 32 one cannot categorically say
the same thing of the Ethiopian detainees. Without doubt, the
conditions of the Ethiopian detention facilities are harsh. However,
Ethiopia is a poor country where the people are exposed to perennial
famine. There is no reason to hold that the detention facilities are
such that they deny the detainees the inherent dignity of the human
person. Neither the Red Cross nor any human rights organization has
characterized Alem Bekagn as cruel and inhuman, but it clearly
beneath the standard set by the Arusha facilities.
C. Delay in the Ethiopian Trials
The most disturbing aspect of the Ethiopian trials is the delay in
bringing Derg-WPE leaders to court. The accused were arrested by
EPRDF troops without a warrant and were not brought before the
court for three years2 6 They now have been incarcerated for seven
years with the conclusion of the first trial nowhere in sight."
Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) mandates that a suspect, once arrested, be tried
without undue delay or released."z The right to be tried without
undue delay was interpreted to mean that the accused is entitled to
324. See Press Conference, supra note 278.
325. See United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1978
Article 10(1).
326. See Todd Howland, supra note 271.
327. As mentioned earlier this delay is a clear violation of international human
rights instruments.
328. See art. 14. "In the determination of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled to the following guarantees, in full equality: ... c) To be
tried without undue delay."
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have his case heard and judgment rendered within a reasonable
time.' The European Human Rights Court accepted that the danger
of flight from the jurisdiction of the court, suppression of evidence by
the accused and prevention of another crime by accused or those
seeking retribution are legitimate grounds for continued detention."
However, if the case is not conducted with sufficient speed, then
release of the accused is warranted. 3
By any interpretation of the law, three years of pre-trial
detention and four more years of proceedings cannot be construed as
being within a reasonable time. Therefore, holding the detainees for
seven years without a conviction is a violation of the international
human rights instruments guaranteeing prompt appearance before
the Court following arrest including the right to speedy trial
enshrined in articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR.
VII. Summary, Evaluation, and Tentative Conclusions
A. The ICTR Trials
The U.N. Security Council established the ICTR for the sole
purpose of prosecuting those responsible for genocide and other
violation of international humanitarian law in Rwanda. By so doing,
the planners and leaders of the 1994 Rwandan genocide would be
isolated and prosecuted to the full extent of the law. The hope is that
the successful prosecution of those responsible will bring about the
reconciliation of the Hutu and Tutsi people and put an end to
impunity which has become endemic to Rwandan society and
evidenced by the perennial cycles of massacres of the Tutsi people in
Rwanda since 1959.
329. See Manfred Novak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Poltical Rights-CCPR,
Commentary, 257 (1993): see also J. Harris, Recent on Pre-trial detention and Delay in
Criminal Proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights, 44 BRiTISH Y.B. IT'L
L. 87, 108 (1971).
330. See Wemhoff Case, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of June 27.
1968.
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of June 27, 1968. See also Sto Muller
Case, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of November 10, 1969 and
Matznetter Case, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of November 10,
1969.
331. Id.
332. Ethiopia acceded to the ICCPR on June 11, 1993. The Covenant entered into
force for Ethiopia on September 11, 1993.
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For carrying out its task, the ICTR has adequate infirastructure, a
large budget supplemented by bilateral grants, relatively qualified
staff at all levels, independent judges accountable only to the law, the
full force of the U.N. Security Council behind them and edicts
binding on all nations.33  Bar associations, human rights
organizations, U.N. agencies, law schools, and some media-though
some were interested more in creating sensations than reporting the
truth about the Tribunal-are ready to help.
The accused are defended by very able attorneys at U.N.
expense. Defense attorneys have adequate resources and time to
prepare their cases and may cross-examine all witnesses, at the
expense of the Tribunal. Witnesses testify in the language of their
choice, and the testimony and other evidence are translated, if desired
by the accused. Pending decision of their cases, the accused are
detained at the U.N. detention facilities in Arusha, Tanzania, which
could be characterized as comfortable-even a higher level than some
of the detainees are accustomed to living. In all, nothing is spared on
the part of the Tribunal to ensure that the accused have justice
conforming to international standards stipulated in various
international human rights instruments and customary international
law. Not even the most ardent critic of the Tribunal dare say the
accused is not given justice.
1. Reconciliation or Coexistence
After spending millions of dollars, will the Tribunal accomplish
its mandate of bringing about reconciliation of the Rwandan people
and eradicating impunity in Rwanda? The appropriate short-term
goal in Rwanda may, in fact, be peaceful coexistence of the conflicting
parties, rather than reconciliation, which will follow peaceful
coexistence.
"Reconciliation, peace, and impunity," in reference to Rwanda,
is almost a clich6, and the trials are viewed by many as a panacea for
solving the myriad problems of the conflict-ridden Rwandan society.
It would be naive to assume that once a handful of the leaders of the
Derg-led genocide are prosecuted by the ICTR, reconciliation of the
Rwandan society will follow automatically. Reconciliation will
require supplemented trials, the peaceful democratization of Rwanda
and reduction of tensions between the Tutsis and Hutus. As Payam
333. See ICTR Statute, art. 28.
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Akhavan pointed out:
If the Tribunal has brought has brought relief, it has been for the
benefit of the spectators, whose conscience has been eased, and
whose credentials as 'civilized nations' have been affirmed. In the
wake of such cataclysm, the achievement of the Tribunal in the
short term can be described as modest at best.S
While this point needs to be pondered over time, there are some
tentative conclusions that may be reached regarding the prospect of
the trials bringing about coexistence and reconciliation.
a. Location
The trials are conducted thousands of miles away from the scenes
of the crimes, by people with little or no knowledge of the victims.
Yet, it is common knowledge that the first prerequisite for
reconciliation is that the victims should have an intimate knowledge
of the trials and be involved in all stages through the media or by
attending the trials as spectators or witnesses. Nothing is more
cathartic than for the victim to see the accused made subservient to
the law. 5 That cathartic effect is lost if the trial is held so far away
from the real party in interest that they will have no knowledge of the
trials. While the situation may be improved, the Rwandan people
have no confidence in the process, even though they recognize the
usefulness of the Tribunal."
b. Class Justice
The rich and powerful planners and organizers of the genocide
334. Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of
Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for RIrVanda. 7 DLE
J. COaNP. & INT'L L. 325, 332-33 (1997).
335. Following the execution of 22 individuals convicted and sentenced to death
by Rwandan courts, Alice Karakazie, a Rwandan lawyer and a Representative of the
Rwandan National Assembly said, "what happened April 24 [the date of the
execution] was more effective than anything that has occurred in Arusha.... May b4
people at the Tribunal are trying their best, but here we need to see people punished
with our won eyes, to know justice, to feel it." Jeffrey Gettleman, Justice in Rrvanda:
A Momentous Task, ST. PETERSBTRG TmEs, May 11, 199S, at 7. After those
executions thousands confessed their crimes and took advantage of drastic reduction
of their sentences, which is provided by the Rwandan law.
336. There were two public demonstrations which were witnessed by the author in
1997 where the hostility was directed against Judge Arbour (the Prosecutor)
personally and not at the Tribunal. In fact, confidence in the Tribunal was e'xpressly
manifested by the demonstrating public through the placards they carried.
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are being tried in an international Tribunal, defended by the best
lawyers, unencumbered by a shortage or lack of resources and
overseen by highly-qualified and independent judges whose edicts
have the force of law throughout the world. While they await trial,
the accused are detained in well-maintained U.N. facilities. If they
are convicted, the defendants may very well be sent to Scandinavian
jails.
3 37
By stark contrast, Rwandan prisons currently hold about 130,000
persons, the majority of whom are peasants, workers, and street
people who committed unspeakable crimes largely at the behest of
those being tried in Arusha.3' Many of these detainees are being
tried without representation by counsel and by new judges with
minimal training and experience because most Rwandan judges were
killed during the genocide or fled the country.3" From the
perspective of reconciliation and peace, class justice creates despair
and anger among the prison population, their relatives in Rwanda
and elsewhere and the victims of these crimes? 40
c. Pace of Prosecutions
The very slow pace of the Tribunal is a source of frustration from
the viewpoint of genocide survivors and their relatives. The
Rwandan courts, for example, began prosecuting defendants a year
after the ICTR and disposed of four hundred cases by the middle of
July 1998, while the ICTR had not completed trying even one case by
the middle of August 1998.3" The slow pace has not augured well for
reconciliation and is the major gripe Rwanda has with the Tribunal.
d. Punishment
While the death penalty cannot be condoned, reconciliation can
take place only if the victims feel that the accused received a fair trial
337. Denmark, Norway and Sweden and recently Mali and Benin have in
principle agreed to house some of the convicts of the ICTR. Earlier African prisons
were found to be inadequately equipped to house the genocide convicls, because the
African prisons do not meet international standards. Those in Mali and Benin will
have to upgraded to meet international standards-whatever that may be. See TfIE
GUARDIAN (London), June 4, 1998, at 1.
338. Oliver Dubois, Rwanda's National Criminal Courts and the International
Tribunal, INT'L R. RED CROSS, November 1, 1997, at 720.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 722.
341. See Zhang Dacheng, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, May 5, 1998.
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and given a punishment proportional to the crime. The duplicity in
punishment, which saves the leaders of genocide from the gallows
while it condemns their minions to death, vill not help reconciliation
in Rwanda.f2
It could also be argued, however, that the prosecution and
punishment of genocide perpetrators may perpetuate antagonism
among the conflicting groups and encourage the perpetrators to lie
low and wait to revenge those they believe were the cause for their
imprisonment or execution of their relatives, especially when those
being tried in Rwanda feel that they are being treated unfairly
because they are poor.- 3 As Mahood Mamdani said, "For every turn
in the cycle that appears as sweet justice to one, appears to the other
as the cruel face of revenge. '
e. Reprisal Killings
One major obstacle to reconciliation is the allegation that the
Tutsi-led RPF undertook large-scale reprisal killings of Hutus. RPF
admits that there were several Hutus killings by rogue soldiers for
which few were court-martialed and punished." However, the
killings were not done with the intent to destroy the Hutus as an
ethnic group; therefore, the RPF killings do not qualify as genocidal
acts. Except being presented with mere allegations by some
intellectuals and Hutu organizations abroad, to the knowledge of the
author, the ICTR has never had any leads upon which to initiate an
investigation.
The trials will, in the long run, help bring about the declared goal
of reconciliation, peace and eradication of impunity in Rwanda. The
effort must be supplemented by, among other things, the
democratization of the Rwandan society where Hutus are real
partners in the governance of their country. As the Chinese proverb
342. After the executions of April 24, 1998, the total silence of the detainees in
Rwanda was broached and thousands started to confess their crimes, thus taking
advantage of a drastically reduced punishment provided in the new Rwandan law.
See. Organic Law 30 August 1996 on the organization of prosecutions for offences
constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1
October 1990, Law No. 8196, Official Gazette of the of the Republic of Rwanda, 30
August 1996.
343. See AFncA NEws, Apr. 23, 1998.
344. Mahmood Mamdani, Living and Dying with the Enemy, THE MAIL &
GUARDIAN, May 22, 1998 at 1.
345. See Edward Luce, THE GUARDIAN (London) Sep. 24,1994.
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goes, "The proof in the pudding is in eating it."
One fact is clear: the very existence of a Tribunal with the power
to enforce a regime of human rights laws will have everlasting impact
on the actions of the present and future leaders in Rwanda, Africa,
and beyond. In addition, the ICIR pushed the frontiers of
international humanitarian law and made, perhaps, the greatest
contribution to the advancement of human rights in Africa that the
United Nations has ever tried.
2. Eradication of Impunity
From the perspective of eradicating impunity, the trials put
Rwandan and African dictators on notice that the wanton massacre of
men, women, and children just because they have a different religion
or belong to different ethnic group will not be tolerated by the
international community. If they value freedom and their lives, these
dictators, of which Africa has more than its share, will think twice
before embarking on a murderous mission and hopefully will be
dissuaded from destruction. From the perspective of discouraging
future similar acts of massacre, the impact of the trials and the
punishment may be minimal for the reasons stated above. In any
case, deterrence of future and present leaders in Rwanda is very
important because large-scale killing or genocide rarely takes place
without the leaders acquiescing to it.
3. The Role of the United Nations
The establishment of the Tribunal and the prosecution of thirty-
five detainees is a woefully inadequate way to redress the millions of
dead Rwandans. Trials are sterile and must be supplemented by
conflict management and resolution measures that aim at changing
the heart of the protagonists and engraving in them the idea that
killing is wrong. Otherwise, as some critics argue, the ICTR will
remain a mere salve, soothing the wounded conscience ot' the leaders
of the United Nations and advanced countries, behind which hide a
million corpses.
Rwanda must be helped in its Herculian efforts to resuscitate a
society from the dead, especially in building a national justice system
that can respond quickly and fairly whenever a crime is committed.
Sitting on the sidelines and criticizing the Rwandan government for
not assigning defense counsels to those accused of genocide in its
courts, when it is well known that most of the judges, prosecutors and
lawyers were either killed or fled the country, is an extreme kind of
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cynicism and hypocrisy.
The United Nations should investigate why it did not intervene
in order to prevent or halt the massacre of a million people, when it
had been forewarned of the impeding disaster." This is very
important for averting these atrocities elsewhere. If these massacres
can take place in a Rwandan society, with a single language, religion,
and culture, with no identifiable territory for individual ethnic groups,
then it can happen in many African countries and elsewhere, where
people are more polarized in religion, culture, and bear historic
animosity to each other. Efforts should be made to contain ethnic
conflicts before they consume millions of lives, as they did in Rwanda.
The Rwandan genocide was not a tribal bloodletting endemic to
Africa, as some people would like to dismiss it. Nor was it a popular
outburst brought about by the anger of the people due to the death of
a popular President. Rather, the Rwandan genocide was a criminal
enterprise planned and executed with deadly efficiency by extremist
Hutu elite. Genocide does not start overnight; it takes long term
planning through ethnic cleansing, setting up an administration
dominated by one ethnic group, launching a campaign of hate by
evoking some past historic grievance, infusing a sense of superiority
on one ethnic group over others, obliterating democratic values, and
generally pursuing a policy that pits ethnic group against ethnic
groups. If the concern of the international community is really one of
cri de couer, such massacres can be prevented through international
pressures. African countries are especially malleable to such
pressures.
Lastly, the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal or
even permanent tribunal is no adequate substitute for judicial
institution building in the countries themselves. The Tribunal should
have been organized in a way that it would help develop a cadre of
Rwandan and African lawyers, investigators, and judges who would
have experience in investigating and trying human rights violations.
From the perspective of judicial institution building, Rwanda, or for
that matter, Africa, gained very little since most of the prosecutors
and defense lawyers are non-Africans. These lawyers and
investigators will take their experiences back to Canada and the
United States where they will be needed the least.
346. Though belated the United Nations has established an investigatory body
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B. Conclusion of the Ethiopian Trials
In contrast to the ICTR, the Ethiopian trials were beset by a
variety of problems, largely emanating from the low level of social
reality which were largely economic and political.
The detainees were arrested by soldiers, rather than the police,
without a warrant and contrary to the accepted norms of international
law. Even before they were brought to court, the accused were
branded criminals by the Proclamation that established the SPO. 7
There was no preliminary inquiry to establish probable cause or to
determine if there was cause to believe that the accused committed
any crime. In many respects, the indictments were not as clear and
succinct as they needed to be for the accused to understand them.
The acts the detainees allegedly committed, while perhaps crimes
against humanity, were not characteristic of genocide.
Because of limitation of resources, attorneys do not have time
nor facilities to do research, confirm witnesses, or mount an extensive
search for evidence that would help exculpate their clients. The court
lacks all kinds of resources and works with a shoestring budget. Most
seriously, the accused were held for first three years without being
brought before a judge and, even after seven years, their case has not
been finalized. All of these factors, without doubt, hurl the cases of
the accused to varying degrees.
On the positive side, the accused either retained or were assigned
highly qualified and experienced defense attorneys. The defense
attorneys directed their witnesses and cross-examined those of the
prosecution freely and with complete independence. From what is
apparent, they defended their clients diligently. Furthermore, the
Ethiopian detainees were tried by reasonably well-trained judges with
extensive judicial experience. Observers at the trial confirm that the
judges carried out their tasks with the utmost seriousness and fairness
despite questions about their independence.""
The most serious failing of the Ethiopian trials is the detention of
the accused for seven years without bail or completion of their case.
The delay to some degree was caused by a violent change of
347. See Proclamation 22/1992. In its preamble, it labels those to be tried as
criminals and murderers. This seems to be faulty drafting of the Proclamation.
348. The judges "suffer from self imposed restraint in cases that touch upon the
Government's interest." Elgesem, supra note 261, at 16.
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government in May 1991."4 The new government dismantled almost
all State institutions, including the court system. The question is no
longer the prudence of doing so, but the realization that once it
happened, all State institutions were forced to adjust. The re-
establishment of the courts naturally took some time. However,
continuing to hold the accused without trial would not only tarnish
the trial process, but it would also vitiate whatever benefit that might
accrue to the Ethiopian society from the trials of the Red Terror
leaders. As the trial drags on, the interest of the public further wanes,
thus losing the cathartic and deterrent effect of the trials.'
By August 1998, the Prosecutor presented five hundred
prosecution witnesses and warned that he had another five hundred
to go. ' 1  Several independent observers confirmed that there are
masses of documentary evidence that will prove the prosecutor's case
conclusively.3 2 With such extensive documentary evidence, one
thousand prosecution witnesses is excessive and unduly infringes
upon the right of the accused to a fair and speedy trial.
One of the purposes of the SPO is "to record for the posterity
the brutal offenses committed" during the temporal jurisdiction of the
Court*.9 The other primary purpose of a trial is to judge the
accused7 The Prosecutor has the responsibility of getting a guilty
verdict fairly and in accordance with the law. The recording function,
while very important, cannot take precedence over the right to a
speedy trial. It seems the Ethiopian court has two functions that may
be contradictory-trying the accused and acting as a Truth
Commission.
Article 2 of the ICCPR provides that any person whose
protected rights have been violated is entitled to "an effective
remedy," determined by "competent judicial, legislative or
349. See Red Terror Relived, THE ECONOMIST, July 30, 1994 at 37.
350. On January 3, 1998 for example, there were very few spectators. From the
rows of seats assigned to the relatives of victims, only 6 seat were filled. See Frode
Elgesem, supra note 295 at 9.
351. Interview of the Special Prosecutor by the Ethiopian Television in Addis
Ababa on July 15, 1998.
352. Discussion between Mr. Todd Howland one time advisor to the Special
Prosecutor, and the author on or around June 1996, in Kigali Rwand (note on file
with author).
353. Proclamation 2211992. See supra note 91.
354. Id. at Preamble.
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administrative authorities."355  The remedies envisioned by the
ICCPR are those available in advanced legal systems, which poor
States are not always able to offer to the same extent.'56 Nonetheless,
a remedy of some sort is mandatory according to ICCP.R. Proposing
dismissal at this stage of the trial, when it is almost over, would be
preposterous, unrealistic, and unfair, and would defeat the whole
purpose of the trial. One appropriate remedy might be to reduce the
period of incarceration of those who have been detained for a period
of time exceeding the time they would be in jail if found guilty.
Finally, there is the case of the several thousand suspects who
have been in custody for seven years awaiting trial."7 If the present
trials are any indication of the speed with which the future trials will
be processed, the new trials will take decades to co:nclude. The
flagrant violation of a person's right to speedy trial should not be
allowed to continue. Now that most of the top leaders of the Derg-
WPE have been prosecuted, Ethiopia needs to look into other
mechanisms for dealing with the excesses of the Red Terror
committed by people who were brainwashed, physical'y or morally
coerced, or intimidated into committing crimes. The South African
Truth Commission and the Rwandan Confessional Process are
possible alternatives. The perpetrators are divided into four
categories with the top planners and leaders being prosecuted to the
full extent of the law, while other groups are given either drastically
reduced punishment if they confess and show remorse or are forgiven
totally." Either of these methods could be used to deal efficiently
and fairly with the less culpable group of perpetrators.
Through these trials, the Ethiopian court has hopefully sent the
message that the massacre of people because of their political views
will not be tolerated. The Ethiopian justice system is historically swift
and brutal when dealing with government protests, while the issue of
official misconduct is glossed over. These trials, despite their serious
shortcomings, are a happy departure from the wholesale massacre of
government officials and their underlings the moment their rule is
overthrown. The 1960 summary execution of government officials
355. See United Nations, International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 2.
356. See Frode Elgesem, supra note 295, at 1.
357. See Yacob Haile-Mariam, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied, THE MONITOR,
July 26, 1999 at 3-4, and July 31, 1999 at 4-5.
358. See Organic Law, Article 9, supra note 342.
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following the attempted coup d'etat by General Mengistu Neway and
his brother Germame Neway59 against Emperor Haile Selassie may
have emboldened Mengistu Haile Mariam to do the same against
Emperor Haile Selassie's officials and others.
These trials should not be looked at as revenge, rather the
ultimate desideratum should be to engrave the rule of law into the
social fabric of Ethiopian society. For this to happen, the accused
must be given justice or in the words of Justice Jackson, the
Prosecutor of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg:
We must never forget that the record on which we judge these
defendants today is the record on history will judge us tomorrow.
To pass (to the accused) a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own
lips as well. We must summon such detachment and intellectual
integrity to our task that this trial will commend itself to posterity
as fulfilling humanity's aspiration to justice..
-
C. Comparing the ICTR and Ethiopian Central High Court
The remaining issue is to draw conclusions regarding which of
the two systems, the ICTR or the Ethiopian Central High Court, is
better situated to render "better" justice, impact the rule of law in the
two countries and achieve the objectives of the prosecutions and
trials. Bear in mind that the Ethiopian trials are not burdened with
the objective of bringing about reconciliation of two conflicting
groups. They are prosecuting and punishing members of a former
regime whose numbers are not large enough to pose a threat to
society if prosecuted and punished.
With abundant resources and all the other ascriptions discussed
earlier, the ICTR has rendered justice to its accused. Nothing
manifestly unjust has been observed in the Ethiopian court, although
it has been beset by a lack of resources and has violated the right of
the accused to a fair and speedy trial. Comparing the mechanical
aspect of the trials, the ICTR process is better than the Ethiopian
one. However, if Ethiopia requested the United Nations establish an
international tribunal in Ethiopia, it would be a serious surrender of
sovereignty, which Ethiopia is not interested in doing. 1
359. See Richard Greenfield, supra note 56.
360. B. FERENZ, A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO WORLD PEACE 7, 15 (1985).
361. Ethiopians have for hundreds of years fought innumerable wvars with
European colonial powers, the Ottoman Turks, Dervishes and others in defense of
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It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the minimum
amount of judicial and material resources necessary for ensuring a
fair trial. There is no doubt that the ICTR has given "deluxe" justice
to the accused. Though the Ethiopian trials are of a lower quality
than the ICTR, in terms of the benefit accruing to the two countries
where these atrocities were carried out, the Ethiopian society as
whole stands to benefit more than its Rwandan counterpart.
It would be untenable to maintain that a court in a poor country,
which does not have the same level of resources as an international
court, cannot try its citizens who may have committed heinous crimes.
There is no plausible reason to maintain, however, that those
presently accused in Ethiopia are entitled to better or more judicial
resources than those Ethiopians who may be charged with murder or
any other egregious crimes.
There are several benefits to the Ethiopian trials. Initially, they
will help create a cadre of lawyers and judges trained in the
prosecution and trial of persons responsible for violation of
international humanitarian and human rights laws, thus strengthening
the domestic judicial system. In addition, because of the proximity of
the trial to the sites of the crimes and the intimate knowledge people
have of the trial, the prosecution and punishment by t:he Ethiopian
court will have a larger deterrent effect on the general population and
present and future leaders of Ethiopia than the ICTR trials on the
Rwandan people. Furthermore, victims who survived and relatives of
those who were massacred are able to see their tormentors held
accountable in an Ethiopian court of law. This has a tremendous
cathartic effect, allowing people to come to terms with their grief,
something that will not be available to the victims and survivors of the
Rwandan genocide. For example, during one of the Ethiopian
hearings, a poor woman traveled from Gondar to Addis Ababa,
about three hundred miles, for the satisfaction of seeing the governor
who killed her only son on the dock."'
In the end, it is likely that the survivors of the Red Terror, and
Ethiopian society in general, will say that they were vindicated by the
trials, while the Rwandan genocide survivors, in all probability, will
believe that those tried in Arusha got away with genocide. This zero
their sovereignty, thus have never been colonized. See, e.g., SVEN RUI3ENSEN, THE
SURVIVAL OF ETHIOPIAN INDEPENDENCE (1976).
362. See John Ryle, An African Nuremberg, NEW YORKER, October 2, 1995, at 2.
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sum result, however, is unsatisfactory and unacceptable both to the
real party in interest, the Rwandans, and the international
community.
It is clear that an international tribunal and national courts are
necessary to deal with crimes that are increasingly becoming
international, more sophisticated and massive in nature. They should
share jurisdiction in a manner that makes them capable of being
effective to deter these crimes and just in their decisions against an
accused. Therefore:
1. The international community should step in and institute its
own prosecutorial mechanism whenever a country is not
willing to prosecute persons within its jurisdiction responsible
for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law, or when a trial by a national court would
be utterly unfair;
2. Prosecution by an international court would also be
warranted when those who are responsible for genocide and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law
abscond the jurisdiction of the country where they committed
the crime and their repatriation is not possible, and
3. A country willing to prosecute persons responsible for
genocide and other violations of international humanitarian
law committed within its jurisdiction must be given the
resources needed to render fair justice, by helping it train its
own prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. These
resources will not only ensure that the trials meet
international standards of justice, but strengthen the national
judicial system of the country where the trial is taking place.
Under these conditions, it would be possible to avoid the
terrible anomaly created in Rwanda, where the rich and
powerful are being tried by an international tribunal which
will render fair justice, while the poor are subjected to sub-
standard justice.
These suggestions would help achieve the desired goals of
eradicating immunity, bringing about reconciliation between
conflicting parties, building the capacity of local judicial system, and
rendering a fair trial.
* * *
